“ My Friend, I will Fight You Forever, Forever”
The Waikato War, 1863-4
It is 2 April 1864. 200 determined men are defending a small, unfinished fort, no more than 80 feet by 40 feet in size and containing 50 women and children. The enemy have surrounded the fort for 3 days. More than 1,000 strong, the enemy have flung themselves at the tiny fort time after time. Three times the onrushing hordes have been thrown back by the tiny garrison, but now ammunition is low, and water has run out entirely. A relieving force has tried to break the siege, but to no avail- the enemy are simply too numerous. The garrison are cut off, completely isolated. They must whittle their bullets from wood, and suck the moisture from raw potatoes.
The enemy is crafty- they have dug a trench to within a few feet of the garrison, and are throwing improvised grenades into the fort. A few men of the garrison, the bravest of the brave, run to catch the grenades, pulling out the fuses before they explode- vital powder to keep the defence going. Other grenades they throw back, bursting amongst the besieging multitude. But how long can the defenders hold out?
There is a pause in the fighting. The attackers ask for the small garrison to surrender to save their lives. But, hopeless as their position appears to be, the leader of the garrison replies that he will never surrender. This unexpected defiance excites the wrath of the besiegers. Now the attackers make use of their deadliest weapon- a small artillery piece dragged up to the very brink of the fort and fired into it at point-blank range. The defenders must now take refuge in their bunkers to weather the galling fire. But now the gun falls silent and two more assaults are flung against the fort in succession- both are repulsed, but the cost to the garrison is mounting.
The garrison’s defiant leader knows that he will have to attempt a breakout. Each man has reserved a single cartridge for this final act. Rising from their trenches, the garrison charge towards the enemy, the men forming a tight square around the women and children. The sheer impetus of the charge breaks through a double-line of the enemy, and the garrison seems through and clear. But immediately a pursuit is mounted. Dodging through bush and swamp, the escaping garrison is harried constantly, even women and children falling to the bullets and blades of the merciless hordes- and once fallen a man, woman or child was unlikely to rise again, as the enemy showed no pity to the wounded. More than half of those defenders who had survived the siege are lost in the pursuit. Yet there are many survivors- including their leader and the honour of their race…
Does this story sound familiar? It is much like many tales of adventure of the Boys Own Adventure variety where a small British garrison holds out against impossible odds against the native hordes. And ,yes, once again this is a story of British soldiers fighting the natives. Yet this story has a difference. For, you see, this time the British are the overwhelming hordes and the natives- Maori warriors to be precise- are the brave and long-suffering garrison…
“My friend, I will fight you forever, forever”- a translation of the defiant words of Rewi Maniapoto, the leader of the garrison in the story told above, when he refused the surrender offered by the British General Cameron. The place was Orakau, New Zealand. A stirring tale indeed, and a strange one to most students of colonial warfare. Yet a stranger thing is that this role-reversal between colonial power and indigenous people was not an isolated occurrence in the New Zealand Wars- on the contrary the British were almost always the numerically-overwhelming attackers and the Maoris the beleaguered garrison trusting in their skills in fortification.
Strangest of all, however, is that the Maori performance at Orakau was actually one of their worst in the Wars. For example at the Battle of Gate Pa, occurring later the same month, 235 Maoris faced a Britsh force of 1,700 regulars and experienced an artillery bombardment 20 times more intense in terms of shell-weight per square yard than that British opening bombardment at the Somme. Not only did the Maori survive the bombardment, but they then proceeded to rout the subsequent full-scale simultaneous British assault on front and rear of their entrenchments, inflicting 111 casualties on the British compared to about 20 Maori lost in the entirety of the battle. The Maori then slipped out of their virtually surrounded position at night without further loss.
Maori Glossary
Aotearoa: “The Land of the Long White Cloud”; Niu Tireni or New Zealand
Hapu: A sub-group within an iwi; a sub-tribe. Some Hapu were many hundreds strong, whilst others consisted of but a few extended families.
Iwi: A major tribe, or confederation of smaller tribes.
Kingitanga: The “King Movement”; an autonomous Maori organisation headed by a Maori monarch.
Kumara: Sweet potato, the main traditional Maori crop.
Kupapa: Pro-British or “Queenite” Maori.
Mana: Semi-magical authority derived from force of personality, great deeds, and proper attention to spiritual matters.
Mere: A one-handed bladed war-club.
Pa: A Maori fortification consisting of earthworks and sometimes supplemented by a palisade.
Pakeha: A person not of Maori race.
Pakeha-Maori: A Pakeha who lives with the Maori and has adopted Maori culture, at least in part.
Pekerangi: A light wooden fence surrounding a pa and constituting the outermost line of defence,
serving to delay attackers and sometimes to support flax matting screening the pa from outside observation.
Pounamu: A type of jade found on the South Island highly prized by Maori and used to fashion ornaments and the most distinguished mere; “greenstone”.
Rangitira: A Maori chief or some sort. Some rangitira commanded an entire iwi, some a hapu, and others only an extended family group.
Tapu: Sacred and forbidden.
Tohunga: A Maori greatly learned in traditional lore; a witch-doctor, medicine-man, shaman or sorcerer.
Taua: A Maori war-band or army.
Tupara: A double-barrelled small arm, usually a shotgun or musket.
Utu: The Maori principle of reciprocality, repaying kindness with kindness and insult with insult. Utu often led to lasting alliances or vendettas between iwi.
Waikato: (1) the Waikato River (also known as the “Horotiu” below the junction with it major tributary, the Waipa); (2) the region through which the Waikato and its tributaries flow; (3) an iwi consisting of a group of tribes living on the lower and middle reaches of the Waikato- sometimes known as “Waikato Proper”; (4) The iwi Ngati Haua, Ngati Maniapoto, Waikato Proper, and the northern branch of Ngati Ruakawa; all of which live in the Waikato region.
Waka: Maori canoe. May be anything from a small, one person canoe, up to a giant war canoe capable of carrying more than 100 warriors.
The North Island of New Zealand in 1863, with inset showing part of the North Taranaki region.
Basic Information
What was the Waikato War?
The Waikato War was the largest of the conflicts known as the “New Zealand Wars” or the “Maori Wars” which took place in mid to late 19th Century New Zealand between segments of the indigenous Maori population, and the Pakeha (non-Maori) British and colonial troops aided by their own Maori allies known as “Queenite” Maori or “kupapa”. The Waikato War lasted for a period of approximately 12 months from 11 June 1863. It was a war primarily (but not exclusively) fought in the Waikato region- a comparatively flat region in the interior of the North Island of New Zealand dominated by the Waikato River and its largest tributary, the Waipa. The British invaded this region in an attempt to defeat a Maori coalition known as “Kingitanga” (“the King Movement”) which drew its core support from the region’s tribes (iwi)., the largest of which was Waikato Proper, the tribe of the Maori King, .
Historically, the British failed to destroy Kingitanga, (indeed, the movement is still alive and healthy today under the Maori Queen, Te Arikunui ) but made considerable inroads into the territory under its control, and seized some of its most productive land. The cost of the great number of troops that were needed to achieve this outcome, however, far exceeded the fruits of the war (in terms of sales of confiscated land), leaving the local Colonial Government in serious debt to the Imperial Government in Britain (there being a “user pays” system of financing colonial wars at that time). Although the Imperial Government was persuaded to forgive this debt, it was at the price of the withdrawal of all Imperial troops, the Colony of New Zealand having, in future, to assume total military responsibility for all future Maori wars. This led in turn to considerable difficulty for the Colony in fighting a new round of battles with the Maori in 1868-9, this time against the followers of two Maori prophets, Te Kooti and Titokawaru.
What was New Zealand Like in 1863?
New Zealand consists of two principal islands of similar size, usually known as the “North Island” and the “South Island”- although the respective Maori names of Te Ika a Maui (“Maui’s fish”) and Te Wahi Pounamu (“The Place of Greenstone”) are more colourful. The islands lie between 34 and 47 degrees south, so are classified as “temperate”. For those more familiar with Northern Hemisphere geography, Italy lies approximately between the equivalent northern latitudes. New Zealand’s climate, however, is strongly influenced by the fact that it is an island nation, and is exposed to the strong westerly winds known as the “Roaring 40s”. The surrounding ocean moderates the seasons, whilst the winds bring plentiful rain. The fact that the two main islands span a distance of some 1,500 km north to south means that there is considerable climatic variation between the extremities- in the northern reaches of the North Island there is no true winter, whilst in the southern reaches of the South Island the winters can be quite severe with extensive snowfalls. In the North Island (in which the Waikato is located), snowfalls are normally confined to the slopes of Mount Taranaki (also known as Mount Egmont) and to the high central plateau which contains the remainder of the island’s high mountains, including the highest, Mount Ruapehu.
All mountains in the North Island of any consequence are volcanic, and those in the central plateau (including Mount Ruapehu) are active. In 186 CE the largest recorded eruption in human history took place on the island (recorded in China and Greece, as the impact was worldwide)- which blasted a hole in the middle of the North Island some 30 kilometres wide and created New Zealand’s largest lake, Lake Taupo. A much smaller (yet still impressive) eruption took place in 1886 a little further north at Mount Tarawera, burying a Maori village and rearranging a nearby lake. A major fault line runs through the centre of the island on a north-south axis, and earthquakes are common.
Most of the North Island is hilly, and in
some places the hills are very rugged. In 1863, the great majority of the
island is forested- in many places with rainforest consisting of native ferns
and timber- which makes access all the more difficult. At this date, the Pakeha
settlements are essentially confined to a few coastal areas of the
In 1860, there were 79,000 Pakeha in the whole of New Zealand, compared to perhaps 55,000 Maori. Due to the fact that the great majority of Maori lived in the warmer North Island, the racial balance in 1863 in the North Island would have been fairly even, with about 50,000 Maori and 50,000 Pakeha. In the 3 years since 1860, however, a major gold rush had occurred in the South Island’s southerly Otago region, with tens of thousands pouring into Otago in a few short years whilst the population of the North Island remained fairly stable. This development has given the South Island the larger Pakeha population and a correspondingly greater political influence. In consequence, there is a move afoot to relocate the capital of New Zealand from its 1863 location at Auckland to Wellington at the southerly tip of the North Island, where it is more readily accessible to South Island residents.
Constitutionally, 19th Century New Zealand was a colony of Great Britain, but from 1852 was allowed a degree of self-government. As at 1863, New Zealand is governed by a governor, Sir George Grey, who is supervised by the Colonial Office in London, and advised by ministers appointed by a Parliament elected by New Zealand voters (who were, at this time, almost exclusively Pakeha). Although this double check on the Governor’s authority should have greatly limited his power, the Colonial Office was half a world away and, as there was no telegraph line linking New Zealand and London at that time, the Colonial Secretary received a limited flow of information- all of which was months out of date at the very least- and so had to leave most of the decisions to the man on the spot. Parliament came to be the main governing institution in New Zealand, but as at 1863 it was divided by regional issues (with each province having its own highly separately-elected provincial government) and no political parties had yet formed, the result being a an unstable set of shifting alliances and short-lived ministries. In these circumstances the experienced and determined Governor found little difficulty in governing the Pakeha-dominated regions of New Zealand as he saw fit. As for the Maori, they happily traded with the Pakeha, but generally observed their own laws and customs, and were governed by their own chiefs.
How Did the British Fight the Maori?
Generally the British sought to find the Maori and defeat them in a decisive battle. This was, indeed, the central doctrine adopted by colonial powers in their wars of empire- matters of strategy favoured the “natives” and matters of tactics favoured the regular troops. In other words, the natives could live easily off the land and disappear into the jungle whenever they liked, but if British troops could only catch up with them the result would be a great victory for British arms. The British did not want to invest thousands of troops in a search-and-destroy type of guerrilla war lasting many years (nor did the concept of burning down unprotected Maori villages appeal to their sense of honour), so they needed to either attack the Maori warriors wherever they gathered in force, or to force the Maori to come out and fight. The result usually involved the Maori constructing and garrisoning a pa (a Maori fort)- either to block a British advance or as a secure base for raiding Pakeha territory- and the British attacking it. The British also had to develop techniques to defend their supply lines and Pakeha settlements against Maori attack- this was usually accomplished by a combination of the construction and manning of redoubts and the despatch of strong patrols to hunt down any Maori taua (war party) in the area.
In 1863, the British troops carried as their standard infantry weapon the Enfield muzzle-loading rifle. This was a weapon very similar to the Springfield rifle that was the main infantry weapon of the American Civil War- it had an extreme range of around 900 yards. Although its range was approximately three times that of the smoothbore weapons that made up a large part of the Maori armoury, the Enfield was slower to load in close-combat as its bullet needed to be rammed home with a ramrod (meaning a maximum of 2-3 shots per minute) whilst a smoothbore shotgun (and a smoothbore musket, albeit at considerable loss of accuracy) could be tap-loaded (the butt being tapped on the ground to jolt the powder and projectile down the barrel), allowing up to 5 shots per minute. As in bush-fighting most shooting took place at less than 100 yards range, the Enfield, although the technologically superior weapon was not necessarily the better weapon in terms of performance on New Zealand battlefields. Carbines and revolvers were made available for specially-recruited bush-fighting units, which was an acknowledgement of the sense of the Maori approach of using shorter-ranged weapons with a higher rate of fire.
The British also used artillery against the Maori, mainly to bombard pa as a preliminary to an assault. British artillery in New Zealand was mainly based around the rifled breach-loading Armstrong gun, although mortars (and howitzers) were also much-used due to their ability to fire at a higher angle and thus have a better chance of inflicting casualties on entrenched troops. The Armstrongs would have had a range in the thousands of yards, but there was no need to fire at a range greater than 1,000 yards as the Maori had nothing that could reply at that distance (indeed, the Maori would have had few weapons capable of hitting anything beyond 300 yards). The usual projectile fired from British artillery was the explosive shell.
How Did the Maori Fight the British?
By the time the New Zealand became a British colony in 1840, the Maori had already several decades of experience with the Pakeha. Although introduced diseases had killed many thousands, and introduced firearms had sparked off ruinous inter-tribal wars (known as the “Musket Wars”), by 1840 the Maori had developed some immunity to the diseases and had plentiful experience with firearms. The Maori proved to be extremely rapid learners and able improvisers, and soon developed techniques of warfare that would prove to be at the cutting edge of 19th Century military practice. They were also very brave, yet not foolhardy- they fought tenaciously and at great odds, but would not throw away their lives in futile-yet-glorious charges. Finally, they were masters of the art of field fortification.
Maoris always had a penchant for
fortification. Traditionally they built palisades and ditches around a
hillcrest, headland or island located close to their villages to create as a
place of refuge in the case of enemy attack. In consequence, much traditional
Maori warfare involved the besieging of pa, although raids and ambushes also
featured prominently. Traditional weapons included the throwing spear, a wooden staff-like weapons, and various forms of one-handed
club made out of wood, bone or stone. The most distinguished of weapons was the
mere, a small, flat club with blunt bladed edges, and if made of the
prized greenstone of the
Prior to the coming if the musket, the defence of a pa was aided by the construction of one or more fighting platforms over the palisade from which the defenders could rain spears down on the attackers from a height. After muskets became common, however, fighting platforms were abandoned as the warriors atop them could be easily picked off by gunfire. Instead, the bases of the palisades were loopholed so that muskets could be fired from a trench dug immediately behind them. Soon many of the complexities of Pakeha gunpowder fortifications were rediscovered by the Maori in the course of the Musket Wars, including corner bastions and the “traversing” of trenches to reduce the possibility of enfilade fire. The Maori also invented new techniques, such as the building of a type of rail fence called a pekerangi a few yards in front of the line of palisades to slow down a storming party (in a similar way that barbed wire would be used in WWI), and the construction out of earth and fern tall musketry towers either outside a pa to dominate its defences or inside to fire down on the attackers over the palisades.
By the end of the Musket Wars, all iwi had accumulated considerable number of guns, and further supplanted their supplies from trade after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. Originally supplied mainly with cheap trade muskets, the Maori soon became more discriminating in their trade and many refused to accept these inferior goods- although some liked the trade musket as being quicker and easier to load than the military musket, and more robust. The Maori thus came to possess a great variety of weapons, including the most modern percussion military muskets and shotguns. The most favoured weapon was the tupara- meaning a double-barrelled musket or shotgun. Occasionally even artillery pieces were acquired, mainly from shipwrecks. Although some Maori preferred to snipe from a distance with a long-range precision firearm, the general preference was for a weapon that could produce rapid and devastating fire at close range- such as against attackers storming a pa or in a close ambush situation.
During the 1846-6 Northern War against British troops, the rangitira Hone Heke and Kawiti encountered for the first time the major use of artillery against their pa. These rangitira, however, very rapidly adapted their pa to compensate. Flax sheets were hung from the pekerangi through which artillery projectiles could pass but which obstructed line of sight, making aiming difficult and accurate assessment of damaged caused to the pa all but impossible. Underground storage pits were modified to act as artillery bunkers with overhead cover- sometimes with loopholes to allow defenders in the pits to fire up at attackers who had entered the pa. The pits were then joined with each other and the trenches by winding underground passages so that the Maori could move to any point within their pa in the maximum of safety. When hiding within such a system of dugouts, the Maori were safe from almost anything the British could fire at them, and even if a shell scored a direct on their overhead cover and penetrated into a bunker, the winding nature of the passages contained the blast to a fairly small area and thus minimised casualties.
It was standard Maori practice to abandon a purpose-built fighting pa after a battle- even if it was the site of a major victory. This was partly out of a belief that the pa was now tapu- sacred ground consecrated by the blood of the dead that should not be profaned by the living. There were also strategic reasons for this practice, however. The British expended great time and effort marching troops and dragging equipment up to attack a pa, and then setting up batteries, accumulating enough ammunition for a bombardment, etc. If the Maori were able to abandon the pa without major loss to themselves and go off and construct a new fighting pa elsewhere, then the British would be put to much greater trouble than if the Maori stayed put in the old pa. To this end, modern pa were almost always constructed with at least one side fronting on difficult terrain that could be used as an escape route when the time was ripe. The Maori defenders of a pa would usually stay to face the first major British assault (in the hope of inflicting major casualties), but had few qualms about abandoning the pa prior to such an assault if the position was considered too weak.
The favourite method of strategic movement for the Maori was the waka or canoe. Waka came in all sizes. The largest waka taua (war canoes) were made out of several large hollowed-out tree-trunks joined end to end, and were designed to carry 100 or more warriors for short distances, and smaller numbers for longer voyages. Small sails could be hoisted to make short sea voyages easier- such as the passage of Cook Strait between the North and the South Island. Waka were not fully seaworthy and liable to capsize in a storm (they did not have outriggers or double hulls like Polynesian long-distance canoes), but if the crews made sure they stayed close to land, the waka could shelter in a bay or be drawn up a beach if the seas became heavy.
A Brief History of New Zealand to 1863
Early New Zealand History
The islands which came to be known as New Zealand by the Pakeha and Aotearoa (meaning “Land of the Long White Cloud”) by the Maori were uninhabited before the Polynesians arrived and settled the islands over the period 900-1300 AD. These Polynesians- the forefathers of the Maori- were primarily agriculturalists brought with them a variety of crops from tropical islands to the north, but many of these crops failed to grow in the cooler climate of New Zealand, or would only grow on the northern extremity of the North Island. The kumara (sweet potato), however, was suitable for the temperate climate of the North Island and the northern tip of the South Island, and became the main staple of the Maori. Further south, agriculture was not possible and only a comparatively small population of hunter-gatherers could be sustained- thus the great majority of Maori came to live on the North Island.
The first Pakeha contact with the Maori occurred in 1654 when Abel Tasman discovered the islands and shot at some Maori canoes that ventured too close. In1770, Captain James Cook visited and introduced the pig to the islands- previously the Maoris had their meat supply confined to birds, fish, eels, shellfish, and an introduced Polynesian rat. Following Cook’s visit, New Zealand (known to the Maori as “Aotearoa”, meaning “Land of the Long White Cloud”) came to be visited by a variety of Pakeha, in increasing numbers as the years went on. By the end of the 18th Century, whaling stations had been set up at various places on the coast of both main islands by both British and Americans, and a French expedition had also visited (with some of its members captured and eaten). The whalers traded with the Maori to obtain supplies, and the latter soon developed a taste for Pakeha firearms.
With their new-found weapons, those Maori iwi fortunate enough to have access to Pakeha were able to raid enemy iwi with impunity, capturing slaves which were then employed to produce more tradable commodities to barter for more guns. The result were the bloody “Musket Wars”, which lasted from approximately 1818 to 1840, in which many iwi migrated large distances to avoid destruction by musket-equipped enemies. During this period, obtaining guns could be essential to tribal survival, and so Pakeha trading partners were much sought-after. Canny Maori rangitira encouraged small Pakeha settlements of missionaries, whalers, or farmers in their tribal lands to ensure uninterrupted trade. War tactics and methods of fortification changed rapidly as all iwi came to possess their share of muskets and learned to adapt to the potentialities of gunpowder. Eventually a near-parity in musket-power was arrived at, and the Musket Wars effectively ceased, but not before large tracts of land had been left all-but-deserted by war casualties, wholesale enslavement, and migration.
The casualties of war were supplemented by the deaths of many thousands from introduced Pakeha diseases. Although the Maori appear to have suffered far less than many other isolated peoples from introduced diseases, by 1840 the combined effects of war and disease approximately halved the estimated 18th Century population of 120,000. Maori population figures declined gradually over the next 56 years (they dipped to an historical low-point of 46,000 in 1896), but by 1840 the worst ravages of first contact were over.
The Treaty of Waitangi
Concerned at the possibility that the French might claim the islands, and feeling a moral duty to attempt to govern a land that was becoming influenced by increasing numbers of English-speaking Pakeha that would otherwise be beyond any European law, the British persuaded the Maori in the far north of the North Island to accept British sovereignty. This acceptance was embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, which was written in the Maori language (by this time many Maori were literate in their own language, and there was a growing number of works published in Maori, most from missionary presses). After the initial signing, copies of the Treaty were taken around New Zealand to obtain as many further chiefly signatures as possible. Many signed, but some refused. Most notable amongst those who refused were the chiefs of the Waikato tribes.
The chiefs who signed did so for a variety of reasons. Some seemingly did not understand the importance of their act, and were induced by presents offered to those who signed to compensate them for their trouble. Many were anxious for closer relations with the Pakeha, as despite the ending of the Musket Wars, Pakeha trade was still greatly prized. Some may have feared that if the British were rebuffed, the French might not be so friendly. Many tribes were worn out from the Musket Wars and perhaps considered that a British presence was the best way of keeping the peace. Finally, the Treaty was generous in its preservation of Maori rights and chiefly authority- but its Maori signatories were not to know that the British were working from a translation into English that did not preserve important concepts present in the Maori original. Of course, it was the British interpretation of the Treaty that came to be implemented by New Zealand’s government- at least until the latter years of the 20th Century.
Hone Heke’s Northern War
As the main point of contact between Pakeha and Maori had been in the Bay of Islands near the northern tip of the North Island, it was no surprise that the first capital of New Zealand was located on the shores of the Bay. In the immediate wake of the treaty, however, thousands of settlers from Britain arrived in New Zealand to establish new towns, the largest of which was Auckland, which had access to several excellent harbours. Thus Auckland rapidly eclipsed the Bay of Islands as the entrepot for maritime trade, and the capital was moved there in 1842. To make matters worse for the inhabitants of the Bay, large customs duties were imposed on the limited trade that remained.
Hone Heke was one of the most important rangitira of the Ngapuhi iwi. The Ngapuhi had profited more than most in the Musket Wars (and bear the major responsibility for starting and continuing those wars), and strongly encouraged Pakeha settlement in the Bay of Islands area to meet their desire for trade in muskets and other goods. Heke was one of the first to sign the Treaty of Waitangi, as was his ally and fellow Ngapuhi rangitira, Kawiti. Both chiefs could reasonably have expected that the signing of the Treaty would bring a new era of ever-increasing Pakeha trade, yet within two years the Bay of Islands was almost deserted by Pakeha shipping. To make matters worse, the Pakeha in the Bay’s major settlement, Korarareka, were apparently now rejecting Heke’s benevolent chiefly authority (benevolent as Pakeha were such a valuable resource to the trade-hungry Ngapuhi). This rejection was symbolized by the flying of the Union Jack from a large flagstaff on a hill above Korarareka. Under this flag, trade was evaporating and the Pakeha were attempting to make rules that told Heke what he could and could not do on his own land. The Pakeha were telling him he could not cut down certain trees, yet when Heke in turn designated trees growing on consecrated ground as tapu, the Pakeha would not listen. Clearly the Pakeha needed to be taught a lesson, yet without harming any of the people Heke referred to with affection as “my Pakeha”.
Hone Heke thus went to the flagstaff and chopped it down. When it was re-erected, he chopped it down again. Erected a third time and a permanent guard placed on it, Heke drove away the guards and felled the flagstaff once more. The British then brought in soldiers and a naval brigade, raised a local militia, re-erected the flagstaff, and built a set of blockhouses guarding both staff and town. On 11 March 1845, Heke and Kawiti determined to take sterner action, mustering around 300 of their men, storming the blockhouses, and chopping down the flagstaff for a fourth time. In the process, they captured Kororareka itself, despite the fact that its blockhouses and other defences were garrisoned by 140 soldiers, sailors and marines, backed up by 200 armed civilians. The British, after having evacuated most of the town’s citizens, bombarded it from their warships in the Bay, setting it alight in the process. After a period of looting, the Maori withdrew.
The British were intent on punishing the “rebellious” Maori, and thus shipped a punitive expedition to the Bay, which then marched on Heke’s economic base, which was defended by a number of pa. The British force were supplemented by several hundred Ngapuhi under Tamati Waka Nene, a rangatira who tried unsuccessfully to dissuade Heke from war with the Pakeha, and who presumably believed that fighting the Pakeha was not a good way to improve commercial relations. Waka Nene’s Maori were used mainly for scouting, raiding Heke’s villages and similar irregular warfare, whilst the British soldiers and sailors concentrated upon meeting and defeating the rebel Maori warriors in battle. As these warriors defied the British from their pa, it was the pa that the British targeted, in an attempt to storm the pa and inflict a quick, decisive defeat which would cause the rebels to come to terms without the need for difficult and protracted “search and destroy” missions through the bush.
The first attempt on one of Heke’s pa was made on 22 April at Puketutu, which was defended by 200 of Heke’s men and 140 of Kawiti’s, and attacked by 300 regular infantry and 140 sailors and marines. Attempting to storm a weak point in the defences accessible via bushland to the rear of the pa, the British were attacked by a band of Kawiti’s men advancing unseen through the bush, and then by a sortie from the garrison. In bloody fighting the British were repulsed, with about 50 casualties being lost on each side. The British made no further storming attempt, but occupied the strategically valueless pa when the Maori garrison abandoned it in accordance with their usual custom.
After a major raid mounted by Waka Nene’s men (at Te Ahuahu on 8 May) was successful against superior numbers of Heke’s warriors, the Pakeha were encouraged to strike against one of Kawiti’s pa. On 23 June, 615 British troops accompanied by 4 light cannon and screened by Waka Nene’s warriors, arrived at Ohaewai Pa, which was garrisoned by a mere 100 of Kawiti’s men, including the rangitira himself. A bombardment of the pa took place, but after little progress was made over six days, and in the face of accurate sniping and sallies from the garrison, the bombardment was called off (after a brief experiment with lobbing “stench bombs” into the pa from mortars) until a heavier gun arrived from the coast. As soon as the 32 pounder cannon arrived and commenced firing, Kawiti launched a major attack on another battery position manned by Waka Nene’s men and a British picket, capturing a 6 pounder and a British flag. Kawiti then ran the captured flag up his own flagstaff, but placed it beneath his own war flag. Stung by the insult, the British Colonel Despard pounded the pa with the 32 pounder until he had run out of ammunition for the heavy cannon, and then ordered a storming party to attack, despite the fact that the flax matting hung from a light fence around the pa (the “pekerangi”) made it difficult to asses the extent of the breach in the palisading. The subsequent storming attempt was a complete disaster, with the storming party finding there was, in fact, no breach to assault, and they were raked by concentrated Maori fire as they endeavoured to create one with their own hands. Their job was further complicated by the fact that the Maori had 5 cannon installed in the pa (4 former ships’ guns of their own, of various sizes, and the captured 6 pounder), and one of these was sited in a projecting bastion near the British assault and, loaded with a bullock-chain, was able to enfilade the assault party at point blank range with unpleasant consequences for the British. The result was a bloody repulse, with more than 110 British casualties to no more than 10 Maori dead throughout the entire siege. Colonel Despard contemplated immediate retreat, but was persuaded by Wake Nene to stay at least until the dead were buried. Soon after, however, the Maori abandoned the pa, and the British (with some difficulty, such was its strength) demolished it before retreating.
There was then a lull in the fighting as peace was explored, but with nothing agreed the British landed large reinforcements in December to bring their force up to 1,300 men, excluding their kupapa allies under Waka Nene. They were equipped with 6 heavy artillery pieces, 5 lighter guns and 2 rocket tubes. This force proceeded to march on Ruapekapeka, Kawiti’s largest pa, which was defended by 400 of his warrior. On 10 January 1846, the British, after having systematically setting up their batteries over the course of many days, commenced an all-out bombardment of the pa, creating 3 breaches. On the same day, however, Hone Heke arrived with 60 men to support Kawiti, having slipped past a force of kupapa deployed to block his way. The next day the pa was found to be apparently abandoned, but when a force of British troops was sent in to occupy it, Kawiti and a dozen warriors fired a volley at them and ran out the back. The British gave chase, but quickly they found themselves in a Maori trap, fired upon from fortified ambush positions in close bushland. The result could have been serious for the British, but a rumour sprang up amongst the Maori that Kawiti captured, causing many warriors to lose control an attempt to retake the pa to liberate their chief. The British, repulsed the Maori counter-attack, returned to the pa and could not be lured out again, and so the Maoris retreated. Once more the British had captured an inherently valueless pa with the Maoris escaping without serious casualties- about 30 dead and wounded to the British 45. The British themselves then quickly abandoned Ruapekapeka, and, constantly fearful of attack, returned to the coast with such speed that they abandoned equipment and ammunition so as to not impede their progress.
By this time, both sides were becoming exhausted by their martial efforts, and peace was soon concluded that saved face on both sides. Heke and Kawiti made a nominal submission, whilst the Colonial Government under Governor George Grey pardoned all “rebel” and allowed them to keep their plunder from Kororareka. The flagstaffat Kororareka remained down- indeed it was not re-erected until 1858 when the Ngapuhi presented the town with a new staff as a gesture of reconciliation with the Pakeha. The customs duties had already been reduced in an attempt to placate Heke. The two “rebel” chiefs remained the major powers in the Bay of Islands. To prove his power, Heke marched into the rebuilt Korarareka (which was renamed “Russell”) with a large military force in late 1846, removed the remains of his men that had fallen in his previous capture of the town, and then peacefully retired. Governor Grey contented himself with a claim that the rebels had been forced to sue for peace after their defeat at Ruapekapeka, and that the Government had merely been magnanimous in its victory. Thus, in a sense, it was the Maori who had won the victory, yet the Government reaped a lasting benefit as the Ngapuhi iwi never warred against the Pakeha again, and during the Waikato War were it was considered one of the few “Queenite” tribes.
Land Sales and Kingitanga
Although the 15 years from the end of the Northern War to 1860 involved some small local conflicts between Maori and Pakeha, race relations were comparatively peaceful. Pakeha areas of settlement slowly expanded by new land being purchased from the Maori, rather than by the use of force. The problem was, however, that the quantity of comparatively vacant yet arable land steadily diminished, and the Pakeha needed to ensure the supply continued in order to promote further settlers to emigrate to the colony. Thus increasingly the purchasers were forced to attempt to arrange land purchases from large groups of Maori who claimed ownership of it. Some of the “owners” would inevitably object, and as to some extent all land was held in common and so one could not simply purchase the blocks of the willing sellers, it was then necessary to continue negotiations until there was unanimous consent to sell.
As time went on, the Pakeha became increasingly frustrated by the difficulties of land purchase, and so tried to cut corners by seeking only the consent of the Maori in direct physical occupation of the land to be sold, and not those who claimed some more remote right. This alarmed the Maori rangitira as the British were no longer obtaining their consent to buy tribal land. As the purchase of land involved an influx of Pakeha onto the land along with Pakeha institutions that did not acknowledge a rangitira’s right to continue to govern that land, land sales effectively shifted sovereignty from Maori to Pakeha.
Faced with steady erosion of their authority, the rangitira decided to confederate so as to put up a common front against land sales. Also, many Maori felt they needed their own government as Queen Victoria and her colonial government seemed to be acting only in the interests of her Pakeha subjects, appointing only Pakeha to government positions and spending almost all government funds in the Pakeha areas of settlement. Although a Maori had equal voting rights to a Pakeha in electing the government, there was a minimum property qualification on voting and “Maori title” to land was not acknowledged for the purposes of meeting that qualification, and the result was that all but the tiny minority of Maori who had a Pakeha title to their land were effectively disenfranchised.
Out of land sales and disenfranchisement, Kingitanga or “the King Movement” was born. Foremost amongst its promoters were the strong and independently-minded rangitira of the Waikato region, and thus a meeting of the rangitira was held in that region in 1857. Although tribal support was not unanimous even amongst those iwi that were represented- the Arawa, for example, refused to be a part of the enterprise- the majority were in favour of the election of a King to preside over the Maori and look after their interests, just as the Pakeha had their Queen. At a second meeting the same year on an island in Lake Taupo, the King was selected- a venerable and famous Waikato war-leader named Potatau Te Wherewhero. Te Wherowhero, in his younger days during the pursuit after a battle in the Musket Wars, is said to have personally killed more than 150 enemy with his mere “Whakareka” before his arm became too tired to continue- but it was also said that many of the victims had begged to be killed by the great rangitira and not some lesser individual, as being slain by a man of such great mana would be in no way demeaning to the victim!
Te Wherowhero was formerly invested as King at Ngaruawahia in 1858. In 1860, the elderly King died and his son of approximately 35 years of age, Matutaera, took his place, with the support of the powerful Ngati Haua rangitira, Wiremu Tamihana, who was known as “The Kingmaker”. Not surprisingly, neither monarch was recognised by the Pakeha- instead Kingitanga was interpreted as a rebellion against the Queen. At first, however, the colonial government had no intention to take military action against the King. As Governor Grey would declare at a meeting in Waikato in 1861, the government would fight against the Maori kingdom with the sword, but “dig around it” until it fell.
The Taranaki War
Racial tensions over land sales came to a head in 1860 at Waitara in North Taranaki, when local settlers purported to purchase a large block of prime farming land without the consent of the rangitira with authority over that land, Wiremu Kingi of the Te Atiawa iwi. The sale process was particularly irksome to Kingi as he not only had chiefly authority over the block, but actually lived on part of it- the Pakeha had only dealt with one group of Maori in physical occupation of the land and decided to ignore the interests of the others. Despite the obvious problems with the purchase even by unexacting Pakeha standards, the colonial government decided to back the settlers against Kingi’s protests. Kingi responded by building a small L-shaped pa in a single night in the middle of the Waitara Block to defend the land against all comers.
Stung by the challenge to governmental authority, the troops garrisoning New Plymouth to evict Kingi by force. On 17 March 1860, 500 soldiers supported by 2 howitzers fired into the “L-pa” for most of a day from as close as 50 yards, but all of Kingi’s small garrison of 80 warriors survived in their bunkers and covered trenches and successfully evacuated the pa after night fell. Although the British troops could now occupy the Waitara block, Kingi and his force were intact and were soon receiving widespread local support. Not only did many Te Atiawa join his force, bringing numbers up to 200 or 300 warriors (some of the Te Atiawa remained pro-British and so did not assist Kingi), but the Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui iwi also mobilised some 400 – 500 men and commenced raiding outlying settlements south of New Plymouth.
It was soon realised by both sides that there was a prospect of intervention by the King Movement in the conflict, and there was a virtual suspension in hostilities during April and May as emissaries from government lobbied the King to stay neutral whilst the Taranaki tribes swore their allegiance to the King and sought reinforcements. The result was that no decision was made for Kingitanga as a whole to intervene, but a small contingent of Ngati Maniapoto went to join Kingi- either on their own initiative or to “test the waters”.
This contingent was present when a Kingi advanced onto the Waitara Block in early June with about 200 men and built a pa at Puketakauere, only a mile from the British camp. The British responded slowly, but before the end of the month the British despatched a force of 350 mostly elite troops from the flank companies and the Naval Brigade, along with the 2 howitzers, to attack the pa. After the howitzers had breached the Maori palisades, troops to the front of the pa assaulted the breach, whilst another party of troops attacked from the rear, the aim being to trap the Maori defenders so none could escape. Unfortunately for the attackers, the palisading was largely a ruse, and the main Maori line of defence was a line of concealed rifle pits to the front of the palisades. The fire from these pits repulsed two British attacks on the front of the position, and then when the frontal attacks ceased the defenders were shifted to launch a counter-attack against the British troops attacking to the rear who had not yet succeeded in breaking into the Maori position. This force of British attackers was shattered in turn, routed, and badly cut up by a Maori pursuit. The British lost 30 dead, 34 wounded, and some ammunition wagons abandoned in the retreat, compared to a mere 5 Maori killed.
No doubt encouraged by this victory, King Matutaera now sent substantial reinforcements to aid Kingi- the number fluctuated between 500 and 800 present at any given time. The Maoris then went on the offensive by raiding right up to the outskirts of New Plymouth and building strong pa within 2 miles of the town and even closer to some of the outlying British stockades vainly trying to protect settlers’ property and guarding the Waitara Block. Despite the fact that the British had 2,000 effectives and still outnumbered the Maori, they withdrew most of the civilians of Taranaki into the centre of New Plymouth, which was fortified and heavily garrisoned. The Maoris then proceeded to loot freely that part of the town outside the fortified perimeter, and set fire to some buildings. In August the pressure on New Plymouth was somewhat diminished as many warriors returned home to plant their crops, but the British were unable to push back the pa cordon around the town as whenever a major expedition was mounted against a particular pa, if weak it would be abandoned by the Maori until a threat to New Plymouth from another direction (or to one of the other stockades) forced the expeditionary force to be withdrawn for use elsewhere. If strong it would be defended and the British could not attack without risking another costly defeat.
After British reinforcements arrived to boost the troops in Taranaki to 3,500 men, a new policy was implemented from December 1860. The British decided to put continual pressure on the Maori by a systematic campaign of sieges against a succession of pa along the Waitara river. These sieges would be conducted by the time-honoured system of sapping- and approach trench would be slowly dug forward under the covering fire of artillery and small arms, and protected by gabions, sap-rollers and the like, until the Maori pa became untenable and could be captured. The British would then consolidate their gain by building a line of redoubts which would be garrisoned and used to guard the supply line for the siege against the next pa.
The sapping method proved slow but produced at least limited results. By the end of 1860 the first pa, Matarikoriko, had fallen, although with 23 British casualties lost in skirmishes to only 6 Maori and with the pa having no inherent value the victory was a dubious one. In January 1861, operations against the second pa, Huirangi, commenced. This time the Maori made a dawn counterattack against one of the British redoubts (No. 3), but unbeknownst to the Maori the garrison had been recently reinforced to 400 men and so the 140 attackers were repulsed with heavy loss. Huirangi was then abandoned, and the British moved to Te Arei in February. Maori resistance here was strong- sniping from concealed pits and launching a successful trench-raid, and so a month later the sap head was still 90 yards from the pa.
On 12 March 1861, a truce was declared. Wiremu Tamihana had arrived from Waikato and persuaded the warring Taranaki tribes to make peace on the basis of the present status quo whilst the Waitara purchase was formally investigated. The colonial government, worn out by the war and with success nowhere in sight, agreed to these terms. The fighting thus stopped with Waitara in Pakeha hands, but the Southern Taranaki tribes had captured the Tataraimaka Block south of New Plymouth and this was left in their control as a result of the truce. As the Tataraimaka Block was more than 6 times the size of the Waitara Block, it was the British that were the net losers in the year-long war.
The Road to the Waikato War
George Grey arrived in New Zealand in September 1861 to assume the governorship (for a second time). He attempted to reconcile with the Maori by offering to renounce the purchase of the Waitara block and to spend money extending administrative services such as magistrates’ courts into Maori areas, in return for an abandonment of Kingitanga. Thus the Maoris’ two main grievances, land sales and failure of the government to provide for Maori and Pakeha alike, would both be at least partly addressed.
These proposals might have proved attractive to many Maori if it were not for the distrust generated by the Governor’s policy of preparing for war even as he attempted to make peace. New troops were shipped into New Zealand (in response to false reports by Grey that Auckland and other places were in danger from large-scale Maori attack), and work commenced on building a major road from Auckland to the Queen’s Redoubt, which stood on the “border” between the Pakeha-controlled Auckland district and the Kingite-controlled Waikato and thus represented the likely starting point for an invasion. Even the new courthouses seemed to be specially designed with defence in mind so they could be garrisoned like castles in Maori-dominated regions. Thus a peaceful settlement was not reached.
In March 1863, Governor Grey went to Taranaki to supervise the reoccupation of Tataraimaka. This was initially done without Maori resistance, but there were subsequently a Maori ambush sprung, followed by a British punitive raid killing 24 Maori. There was no general resumption of fighting in Taranaki, however, as the Waitara purchase was officially renounced on 11 May. This meant that the land situation was now restored to the position of 1859, and thus the issue over which the Taranaki War had been fought was essentially resolved. In consequence, Grey felt safe in transferring the bulk of the troops remaining in Taranaki to Auckland, ready to participate in a major invasion of Waikato, which now seemed the only way to suppress the King Movement.
Personalities of the Waikato War
British Player Characters
Governor Sir George Grey
Governor Sir George Grey
Bio: Governor of New Zealand from the end of 1861. This was Grey’s second term as governor (his first term was from November 1845 to 1853), and his extensive experience in New Zealand gave him a better understanding of local conditions than most Pakeha in positions of authority. He had genuine sympathy for the Maori, but saw his principal constituency was the Pakeha settlers and thus took up their cause. Although supposedly under the control of the Colonial Office in London, Grey was able to use his virtual monopoly on reports sent to the Colonial Office to paint a false picture of Maori aggression in order the secure the troops he needed to suppress Kingitanga. He also fancied himself as a military commander, and was willing to take control of military operations if there was no general nearby.
Role: Governor Grey is the British Commander-in-Chief. He is responsible for all civilian matters and diplomacy with the Maori (both hostile and neutral), and may also take command of any theatre of war or operation not directly under the control of another British player character. He is also responsible for any raising of troops or other military resources from the North Island Pakeha population, or from the Queenite tribes.
Starting Forces: Governor Grey starts with all British (and colonial) land forces listed, other than those starting in Auckland Province.
Lieutenant-General Sir Duncan Cameron
General Cameron
Bio: In overall command of the British (and colonial) land forces in New Zealand and intending to personally lead the main military effort. Cameron was an able commander and administrator, and had extensive battle experience in the Crimean War. Although initially unfamiliar with New Zealand and the Maori, he quickly learned on the job, and soon developed a good understanding of Maori military methods. He also developed respect for the Maori as a people, to the extent that in operations after the Waikato War he became reluctant to use his troops to support what he perceived as land-grabbing exercises by the settlers.
Role:
General Cameron’s responsibility is to lead the British land forces in the most important
theatre- which is likely to be Waikato for at least the majority of the war.
Cameron should try to confine himself as much as possible to the business of
conducting offensive land operations in the principal theatre, leaving his
colleagues to take care of all other matters.
Starting Forces: General Cameron starts with all British (and colonial) land forces listed as present in Auckland Province.
Commodore William Saltonstall Wiseman
The Armoured Gunboat “Pioneer”, Commodore
Wiseman’s Most Potent Weapon on the Waikato
Bio:
Appointed Commander of the Australasian Squadron in
April 1863, in place of the luckless
Role: Wiseman has three roles. The first is to support British land forces- especially those commanded by General Cameron in the principal theatre- through the use of naval assets, such as gunboats, river transport corps, and Naval Brigade. Setting up a riverine supply system is likely to be an important part of these duties. The second is to conduct independent naval operations. These may be combined operations using whatever troops can be spared by the other players or newly-raised forces. Such operations may result in a new theatre/s of war being created, of which Wiseman would then assume command. The third role is to procure, and ensure the safe and speedy passage to the North Island of, reinforcements and supplies from the South Island or abroad.
Starting Forces: Commodore Wiseman starts the game will all listed British (and colonial) naval forces.
Kingitanga Player Characters
King Tukaroto Matutaera Potatau Te Wherowhero (Tawhaio)
King Matutaera
Bio: Son of the first Maori king, Potatau Te Wherowhero, Tukaroto was so named after one of his father’s battles, and later received the additional, baptismal, name of Matutaera (“Methuselah”). He succeeded to the kingship on his father’s death in 1860, at which time he was probably in his early 30s. He is best known to history by the name Tawhiao, which he received on 29 August 1864 from the Pai Marire prophet Te Ua Haumene after the conclusion of the Waikato War, but to avoid anachronism he will in this game be referred to by the name Matutaera as this was his principal name at the start of the Waikato War.
Like his opposite number, Queen Victoria, Matutaera was both a figurehead for his people as well as having considerable influence on policy, but could not rule other than by the consent of his senior “ministers”, the main Maori chiefs. The King was generally disposed towards the more moderate policy of Tamihana, although like Tamihana he was quite prepared to fight the Pakeha rather than give in to unacceptable demands. Later in life, Matuera (then known as Tawhiao) became a prophet and a pacifist.
Role: The King is, not surprisingly, the Commander-in Chief of Kingitanga. As well as looking after matters of economics, diplomacy, politics and other non-military affairs, the King is responsible for controlling any Kingite forces that are operating outside the regions commanded by the other 2 Maori players.
Starting
Forces:
Wiremu Tamihana Tarapipipi
Wiremu Tamihana Tarapipipi
Bio: Rangitira of great mana of the Ngati Haua iwi. Known as “the Kingmaker”, Tamihana was instrumental in establishing Kingitanga, and was the most influential figure in the movement other than (perhaps) the King himself. In his 50s during the Waikato War, Tamihana had in his youth many years of military experience during the Musket Wars, but in later life focussed on the arts of peace. He was both eloquent and an excellent administrator, devising a code of laws and setting up roads, schools and a postal system for his tribe prior to the Waikato War, as well as improving agriculture. He was also a committed Christian, building churches, protecting missionaries, and being well conversant with argument from a scriptural basis.
Tamihana wished Maori to live in mutually-beneficial harmony with the Pakeha, rather than entertaining any thought of “driving them into the sea”, but wanted to preserve a zone of Maori autonomy within New Zealand’s interior to balance the Pakeha domination of the coastal areas. He was a peace-maker rather than a war-monger, but was prepared to fight for his vision.
Role: Tamihana bears prime responsibility for Maori forces in the Waikato reagion east and north of the Waikato river (including but not limited to the lands of the Ngati Haua iwi) and in the neighbouring lands controlled by the Ngai-te-rangi, Ngati Maru, and Ngati Paoa iwi.
Starting Forces: Tamihana starts with command of the main Maori “army” at Meremere, and the outlying forces at Koheroa, and Paparata.
Rewi Maniapoto:
Rewi Maniapoto
Bio: Rangitira of great mana of the Ngati Maniapoto iwi (indeed, a direct descendant of the iwi’s founder), and a founding Kingitanga chief- although, contrary to general Pakeha belief at the time, not the principal leader of the movement. Rewi was probably in his 50s during the Waikato War, and was a veteran of the Musket Wars- in fact, serving in one battle under Te Wherowhero himself. He is perhaps the most experienced and able war-leader in Kingitanga at the outset of the Waikato War.
Rewi was more generally more “hawkish” than the King or Tamihana, but was not the hot-headed extremist that many Pakeha believed him to be, and was also a good “team player” known to sacrifice his own views on occasion in order to accommodate his fellows (indeed his famous “last-stand” at Orakau that helped establish his “hardline” reputation took place against his own better judgement in order to satisfy the wishes of other chiefs who had brought contingents to support Kingitanga and were anxious to engage in a battle).
Role: Rewi bears prime responsibility for Maori forces in the Waikato region west and south of the Waikato River (including but not limited to the lands of the Ngati Maniapoto iwi), and in Taranaki.
Starting Forces: Rewi starts with command of the force at Pukekawa (which may raid across the Waikato if desired), as well as the forces at Okato and Waitara in Taranaki.
Other Persons of Note
Alfred Domett: Premier of New Zealand from 6 August 1862, and parliamentary representative for Nelson (in the South Island). Domett had a hard-line Maori policy, supporting punitive land confiscation rather than negotiation. A strong supporter of the Waitara purchase, he was damaged politically when the purchase was renounced in May 1863 at the Governor’s insistence. A memo revealing an over-enthusiastic land confiscation policy led to the loss of further support, and he resigned on 30 October 1863.
Te Ua Horopapera Haumene: Maori prophet who founded the Pai Marire religion (also known as “Hauhau”) in Taranaki in 1862-3. Pai Marire was a combination of Christianity, traditional Maori beliefs and elements novel to both, and is still practiced today in a slightly modified form. Te Ua was a man of peace, but many of his senior disciples had a more violent interpretation of their religion, urging followers of the faith to kill Pakeha and promising that they would be immune from bullets if they truly had faith. Although such an interpretation was contrary to Te Ua’s teachings, the Pakeha soon came to think of all “Hauhaus” as dangerous and bloodthirsty fanatics. Pai Marire influence was limited to Taranaki at the time of the Waikato War, although it was soon to spread throughout the North Island and was a major factor in subsequent Maori/Pakeha warfare which lasted until 1872.
Colonel H. J. Warre: Commander of forces in Taranaki. He had a pet theory that “foreign priests” (presumably French) were encouraging and fostering Maori rebellion.
The
Set Up
Unit sizes are expressed in increments of 50 men. For colour, these are referred to as “companies”, although a full-strength company of British regulars was historically larger than 50 men.
Each Pakeha unit is graded from A-D with respect to troop quality, with A being the best and D the worst. Maori units are not graded for quality, as their fighting ability often depended more on their degree of commitment to a cause or inspirational qualities of their leaders than being a fixed quantity. Maori warriors at their most inspired would be considered “A” grade troops, but vacillating Kupapa considered as third-rate troops by their Pakeha allies might fight as such and be considered “C” grade. Kingite Maori would generally be classed either as “A” or “B” depending on circumstances.
British regiments include the “flank companies” designated as “light infantry” and “grenadiers” which are deemed to consist of the unit’s elite and thus have a higher quality rating than the remainder of the unit. “Naval brigades” consisted of marines and sailors drawn from Royal Navy warships, tended to be used in New Zealand as assault troops, and enjoyed a good reputation- they are thus classified as “A” grade troops.
British
Land Forces
Auckland
Province
Queen’s Redoubt: 12th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys); 14th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys); 40th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys); Colonial Defence Force Cavalry (B, 3 coys)
Drury: 65th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys); Auckland Militia (D, 2 coys); Imperial Transport Service (part) (C, 10 coys)
Otahuhu: 70th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys); Auckland Cavalry Volunteers (C, 4 coys); Auckland Rifle Volunteers (C, 3 coys); Auckland Militia (D, 2 coys)
Fort Britomart, Auckland: Royal Engineers (B, 1 coy), Royal Artillery (B, 2 coys), with artillery as follows:
6 x 12 pounder
6 x 6 pounder
6 x 24 pounder howitzers;
6 x 24 pounder muzzle-loading fortress guns; and
6 x 32 pounder muzzle-loading fortress guns.
Albert Barracks, Auckland: Auckland Militia (D, 4 coys)
Driving Wagons between Drury and Queen’s Redoubt: Imperial Transport Service (part) (C, 5 coys)
Taranaki
Province
Tataraimaka: Part 57th Regiment (B, 5 coys)
New Plymouth: Part 57th Regiment (A, 3 coys; B, 2 coys); Taranaki Rifle Volunteers (C, 2 coys); Taranaki Cavalry Volunteers (C, 1 coy); Taranaki Militia (D, 2 coys);
Bell Block: Part 57th Regiment (B, 5 coys)
Wellington
Province
Wellington: Colonial Defence Force Cavalry (B, 2 coys)
Wanganui: Colonial Defence Force Cavalry (B, 1 coy)
Hawke’s
Bay Province
Napier: Colonial Defence Force Cavalry (B, 1 coy)
Available
from Sydney, Australia
1 x 110 pounder
2 x 40 pounder
2 x 46 pounder mortars; and
6 Coehorn Mortars.
Naval Forces
Only the River Flotilla is capable of true riverine operations, although all vessels may enter Waikato Heads to disembark or transfer their cargo in the shelter of the river mouth.
“Short distance” transport is that involving 12 hours of travel or less. This would be around 60 miles for the average vessel at sea or moving downriver, or 15 miles moving upriver (taking into account the current and the distance lost in following the river’s twists and turns). As troops travelling for more than this length of time need to be provided with sleeping accommodation, food, water and similar facilities, “long distance” troop transport (anything more than 12 hours) is much more space-intensive than for short distances (in which one can almost pack as many men in as there is room to stand).
Transport capacity is per trip.
Ocean-Going
Vessels of the Australasian Squadron Based in Sydney
Steam Frigate “HMS Curacoa”: 23 guns; 1,571 tons; can transport and supply 20 coys for long distances or transport 80 coys for short distances; able to contribute (A, 2 coys) to Naval Brigade.
Steam Corvette “HMS Esk”: 21 guns; 1,169 tons; can transport and supply 15 coys for long distances or transport 60 coys for short distances; able to contribute (A, 1 coy) to Naval Brigade.
Steam Corvette “HMS Miranda”: 15 guns; 1,039 tons; can transport and supply 15 coys for long distances, or transport 60 coys for short distances; able to contribute (A, 1 coy) to Naval Brigade.
Ocean-Going
Vessels of the Australasian Squadron in Manukau
Harbour (based at Onehunga)
Steam Barque “HMS Eclipse”: 4 guns; 750 tons; can transport 10 coys long distances or transport 40 coys for short distances; can contribute (A, 1 coy) to a Naval Brigade.
Steam Barque “HMS Harrier”: 4 guns; 700 tons, can transport 10 coys long distances or transport 40 coys for short distances; can contribute (A, 1 coy) to a Naval Brigade.
Small
Colonial Coastal Vessels in Waitemata (
Patrol Steamer “SS Auckland”: 2 guns; can transport 3 coys short distances.
Despatch Vessel “Sandfly”: 1 gun; can transport 3 coys short distances; sailing vessel.
Gun Schooner “Caroline”: 1 gun; can transport 2 coys short distances; sailing vessel.
Cutter “Midnight”: 1 gun; can transport 1 coy short distances; sailing vessel.
River
Flotilla (at Onehunga):
Armoured Paddlewheel Gunboat “Avon”: 1 x 12 pounder Armstrong; can carry 2 coys short distances; can additionally tow 1 armoured barge upstream; medium size.
4 Armoured Gun Barges: 1
x 12 pounder
Unarmoured Screw Steamer “Gymnotus”: no weapons; towing a rowboat behind it can carry 1 coy short distances; essentially a large canoe with a steam engine; too small to tow an armoured barge upstream; small size.
A number of large rowing boats.
Reinforcements
En
Route
Note: Arrival dates and locations are subject to change by Argument.
- The 18th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys) will arrive by ship in the course of July 1863. It will land at Auckland.
- A large river gunboat has been ordered from a Sydney shipyard, and will arrive at Onehunga in early October 1863. Its characteristics are as follows:
Armoured Paddlewheel Gunboat “Pioneer”: 2 x 12 pounder Armstrong; can carry 4 coys short distances; can additionally tow 3 armoured barges upstream; large size.
Additional
Potential Reinforcements
- There are 3 further British regiments available to be shipped to New Zealand, the 43rd, 50th and 68th Regiments (each B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys). Due to the distance they must travel by sea from their present stations (India or even further abroad), at least 2 months must be allowed between their departure and their arrival in New Zealand.
At this point in time the British government charged colonial governments a fee of £40 per soldier per year for troops over a certain free quota. New Zealand is already way over the free quota, and so each new regiment will substantially add to the cost of the war. The only way the money can be recouped out of the war is to conquer and confiscate large tracts of good land to sell after the war.
Drafts of replacements for casualties can also be sent for to make existing regiments up to strength. Again, there will be a minimum of 2 month’s delay.
- In terms of potentially available supporting units, there is a battery of Royal Artillery (B, 1 coy, with 6 x 12 pounder Armstrong), plus a battalion of Military Train to supplement the Imperial Transport Service (C, 15 companies) are available, again on 2 month’s notice.
- Designs have been drawn up for a new class of medium gunboat to be constructed at Sydney. Construction and delivery of any gunboats ordered will take approximately 2 months. The design has the following features:
Iron Paddlewheel Gunboat: 2 x 12 pounder; can carry 2 coys short distances; can additionally tow 1 armoured barge upstream; medium size.
- Able-bodied male Pakeha citizens of the North Island can be called up for military service of some sort. The total numbers potentially available in each closely settled area are given on the Political Map. Some of these recruits have been called up at the start of the game and incorporated into “Militia” or “Volunteers” units, and so the numbers in such units must be deducted from the map figures to determine the further numbers available. These figures represent about 20% of the total Pakeha population of each of these areas. Most of the recruits produced by this means will have no pre-existing military experience and, unless first trained are likely to be D grade troops suitable only for militia duty or transport work in rear areas. A small percentage (perhaps 5%), however, will be sturdy, straight-shooting, frontiersmen that can form the basis of elite “ranger” units.
Remember that able-bodied male citizens were a crucial part of the economy. Calling up the entire pool for protracted full-time service will thus have serious financial consequences for the region in question.
There are scattered Pakeha settlements beyond the closely settled areas. Rather than form part of the militia pool, these settlers will instead remain in their settlements to defend them from Maori attack. It was typical to fortify a building, such as a church, as a rallying point for local settler defence.
- Volunteer regiments can be raised in the South Island and Australia, both of which have recently enjoyed a gold rush attracting large numbers of settlers. Many gold miners will not be faring well and may be interested in an offer of regular pay and a small land grant (of confiscated land) upon expiry of service. 5,000 troops (100 companies) should be able to be raised in this manner without too much difficulty. Being volunteers and not conscripts, with a little basic training they should rate as “C” grade troops. The recruitment, training and shipment process, however, will take a minimum of 2 months.
- There is the possibility of raising kupapa warriors from the Queenite tribes (which are, that the war’s outset, the Ngapuhi, the Arawa Confederation, and some northern hapu of Waikato Proper). The main difficulty is that, although pro-British, these tribes are unlikely to go out of their way to fight the Kingites unless they have some reason to do so. Historically, some northern Waikato offered their services for riverine transport duties, but most of these subsequently defected to Kingitanga after the first major Kinite raid into their territory. The majority of the Arawa became staunch enemies of the Kingites, but only after a large taua of East Cape Kingite warriors attempted to force their way across Arawa territory as a short cut to Waikato. Even then, some hapu of the Arawa supported the Kingite cause, and sent a contingent of warriors to help their neighbours, the Ngai-te-Rangi, in resisting British encroachment. As for the Ngapuhi, they are a long way from the theatre of war, and would need a major incentive to become involved.
Kingite Maori
Mobilised Forces
Note: All Maori forces (other than the small force at Koheroa, which is essentially a scouting party) occupy earthworks. In all cases, however, these fortifications could be stronger and more complete.
Waikato Region (all a mixture of warriors from the Waikato tribes of Waikato Proper, Ngati Maniapoto, Ngati Haua, Northern Ngati Ruakawa)
Meremere: 20 coys, with 1 x 24 pounder cannon; 1 x 12 pounder cannon; 1 x 6 pounder swivel-mounted cannon. The cannon are located in fortifications on a hill, and are sited to fire down through embrasures at any river traffic on the Waikato that might attempt to pass the Maori fortified position at Meremere. They lack cannon balls, and must instead rely on improvised projectiles such as bullock chains, steelyard and grocers’ weights, and scraps of iron. The cannon are manned by trained gunners, educated by an old Pakeha-Maori who had served as a artilleryman in the forces of the East India Company.
Paparata: 5 coys
Koheroa: 2 coys
Pukekawa: 5 coys
Taranaki Region (all from Taranaki tribes of Te Atiawa,)
Waitara: 6 coys (Te Atiawa)
Okato: 6 coys (Taranaki Proper, and Ngati Ruanui)
Potential Reinforcements
The Political Map shows an approximation of the number of warriors each tribe possesses. This number is assumed to be around 25% of the total population of the tribe in question. Some tribes have already mobilised some of this strength, and these mobilised warriors must be deducted from the available pool when determining the number of potential reinforcements.
As explained in the guidelines for supply, it is difficult for any tribe to keep anywhere close to its entire warrior strength in the field indefinitely, particularly if it is geographically remote from the theatre of operations.
In the case of neutral tribes with Kingite sympathies, some hapu (or families within a hapu) may feel more strongly about the issue than the rest of the iwi and may leave home to fight alongside the Kingites. The size of these contingents will be small, however- no more than 20% of the iwi’s total warrior strength- and the warriors of each contingent are likely to need to return home after only a few months in order to look after their families’ needs.
The Maori have in their possession two old ship’s cannon (12 pounders, say), which are stored at Te Kopua (on the Waipa). The cannon lack carriages, but if these are improvised (and some sort of projectiles found) the guns should be serviceable.
Object of the Game
In order for either side to win a decisive victory, they must destroy the other side’s will to fight by reducing their enemy’s Morale to 0. If the Kingite Morale falls to 0, this represents the complete destruction of Kingitanga and the abandonment of centrally-organised Maori resistance to British rule. If British morale falls to 0, this represents the British acceptance that Kingitanga cannot be conquered by force, and so de facto dual control Pakeha/Maori of the North Island will have to be accepted or the Treaty of Waitangi renegotiated in the Maoris’ favour to win them back to the fold.
If neither side has won a decisive victory by the end of the turns representing June 1864 (essentially after 12 pairs of turns), then the matter is decided on points. Each side scores points equal to their Morale at the end of the game multiplied by 5, and then makes adjustments as set out below, with the winning team being the team with the highest point count. This point balance represents the relative bargaining positions of the two sides at the end of the war, and consequently how favourable the negotiated resolution of the Kingitanga issue will be to each side.
Note: As many aspects of game performance will already be reflected in the Morale scores, the adjustments only represent those matters important to victory that are either unlikely to impact on Morale, or which have more important long term consequences that their immediate effect on Morale would suggest.
British
The Colonial Government of New Zealand is most concerned about its ability to balance the books at the end of the war, as a large debt will weaken its ability to afford troops to fight in any subsequent war against the Maori. Thus if extra troops are brought in (which must be paid for by the Colony) or expensive capital items purchased (such as gunboats), a debt will be created, but if saleable land can be captured and sold after the war then some expenses can be recouped. Troop casualties are not a major problem (over and above the Morale effect), as it is living troops that must be paid for, not dead ones.
-5
for each Regiment of British
infantry brought to
-3 for each new gunboat ordered (other than the Pioneer, which is already under construction).
-1 for each further 5 companies of Military Train or Volunteers (raised locally or abroad) formed or brought into New Zealand.
-5 for each month ½ or more of the militia pool in Auckland is called up to serve as Militia, Volunteers, or in some other military capacity.
-3 for each month ½ or more of the militia pool in Wellington is called up to serve as Militia, Volunteers, or in some other military capacity.
-2 for each month ½ or more of the militia pool in Napier or New Plymouth is called up to serve as Militia, Volunteers, or in some other military capacity (per town)
-1 for each month ½ or more of the militia pool in Wanganui, Coromandel Goldfields, or Bay of Islands is called up to serve as Militia, Volunteers, or in some other military capacity (per town)
+5 For each of the following held by the British at the end of the game: Hangatiki, Kirikiriroa, Ngaruawahia, Matamata, Okato, Rangiowhia, Tauranga, Te Awamutu, Te Tiki, Waitara.
Kingitanga
Kingitanga needs to retain as much as it can of its core Waikato territory as a secure inland base. It must avoid, however, the loss of too many Kingite warriors, as unlike Pakeha soldiers, they are not easily replaced.
+ 20 If Rangiowhia held by Kingitanga at the end of the game.
+ 10 For each the following held by Kingitanga at the end of the game: Hangatiki, Matamata, Ngaruawahia.
-1 For each company of Kingite warriors that are casualties and have not been recovered by the end of the game (as would be wounded who have healed or captives who have escaped).
Rules
- Players are organised into 2 teams- the British and Colonial forces (“the British”) and the forces of Kingitanga (“the Maoris”). Each team has a Commander-in-Chief (“C-in-C”) and 2 other players. Each player has a character, the details and responsibilities of which are outlined elsewhere. Players are not precluded in their Arguments from dealing with matters in their team-mates’ areas of responsibility, but should ensure that their characters’ own responsibilities are the main focus of their Arguments. If a player’s character dies, the referee will assign that player a new character with similar responsibilities to the first (deceased) character.
- The game is played in turns. In any given turn the players on one team only submit Arguments. The other team’s players then submit their Arguments in the following turn. The British team takes the first turn of the game. Each pair of turns (the British followed by the Maori) represents the passage of 1 month, the first pair representing July 1863. The maximum length of the game is 12 pairs of turns, the last pair representing June 1864. If, however, the Maoris make one or more Thrusts on their last turn of the game, there will be a subsequent special British turn in which the British may attempt to Parry those thrusts.
3. Except when using a Desperate Defence; on the very first (British) turn of the game; or on the special British turn at the end of the game, each player is limited to making 2 Arguments per turn. On the first turn of the game, the British team is limited to 1 Argument per player (which Argument will be, of necessity, a Thrust). On the special British turn at the end of the game (if required), each member of the British team can make a maximum of 1 Parry (other than Desperate Defences), and no Thrusts.
4. Except on the first (British) turn (in which all Arguments must be Thrusts), a player may choose to use each Argument as either a Thrust or a Parry. A Thrust is an Argument that initiates something new into the game- as with a traditional, regular Matrix Game Argument. A Parry is an Argument used in an attempt to modify a particular Thrust made by the opposite team in their immediately preceding turn, and is a little like a traditional Conflict Argument.
5. Each Thrust is immediately determined by the referee to be either Valid or Invalid. A Thrust is ruled Invalid if it:
(a) Is based on a premise which contradicts the established facts of the Matrix to a significant degree;
(b) Is ruled as having a negligible probability of being true; or
(c) In the context of an essentially historical game, it is just plain stupid.
An Invalid Thrust immediately fails and plays no further part in the game. Note: it is not intended that many (if any) Thrusts will be ruled Invalid. This ruling is intended to be as rare as the ruling of an Argument as Stupid in a traditional Matrix Game.
- A Valid Thrust is not immediately resolved in the turn of the player making it, but its adjudication is suspended until the next turn of the opposing team. Each Valid Thrust is assigned by the referee is assigned to a particular opposition team player for possible Parrying. The referee will pick the player according to which of the opposing team players the referee considers is most affected by the Thrust. If there is no player obviously affected, then the Thrust will be assigned to the opposing C-in-C.
- If no Parry is made by the assigned player on the opposing team with respect to that Thrust, then the Thrust automatically succeeds in that next opposition turn without the need for a die roll.
- A Parry is made by describing how and why the event/s described in the Thrust differ from those originally postulated. A Parry must dice for success, and if it fails then the Thrust succeeds in its original form. If the Parry succeeds, the Trust succeeds only in the form as modified by the Parry.
- The referee determines the Strength of a Parry by a two-stage process. Firstly, the referee assigns a Basic Strength rating to the Parry from Extremely Weak to Extremely Strong by comparing the inherent probability of the Parry to that of the Thrust. If both are considered equally likely, then an Average rating will be given. If the Parry is considered more likely, it will be rated as Strong, Very Strong or Extremely Strong, and if less likely it will be rated Weak, Very Weak or Extremely Weak depending on the degree of difference in probability.
- Once the Basic Strength of a Parry is determined, the referee shifts the rating up or down to arrive at the final Strength rating. This is done by applying a bonus or penalty according to the extent to which the Parry seeks to modify the Thrust, with the greater the modification the less the chance of the Parry succeeding. Guidelines to the referee with respect to this second stage are as follows:
(a) If the Parry seeks to totally nullify or contradict the Thrust- for example, by saying that the Thrust totally fails and instead a totally contrary event (or nothing at all) happens- then the Basic Strength is lowered by 2 ratings.
(b) If the Parry admits only minor elements of the Thrust, but otherwise seeks to nullify or contradict it, then the Basic Strength is lowered by 1 rating.
(c) If the Parry admits significant elements of the Thrust but seeks to reverse the ultimate effect of the Thrust (such as by Arguing that a battle indeed occurs but a different side wins), then there is no modifier to the Basic Strength.
(d) If the Parry admits major elements of the Thrust, but makes important changes short of reversing the result, then the Basic Strength is raised by 1 rating.
(e) If the Parry makes only minor changes to the Thrust, then the Basic Strength is raised by 2 ratings.
If by the above means the rating is shifted above Extremely Strong, then the Parry automatically succeeds. If the rating is shifted below Extremely Weak, then the Parry automatically fails.
- Having determined the Strength of the Parry, the referee rolls a die to determine its success. The rolls required for success for each given rating are as per the usual Matrix Game rules. The new rating of Extremely Weak requires the roll of a 6 and then a re-roll producing another 6 to succeed, whilst an Extremely Strong Parry will succeed on any roll except a 1 followed by a re-roll producing a second 1.
- Each team has a Morale rating, which reflects the enthusiasm of its forces for continuing the fight. Morale ratings range from 10 (highest) to 0 (lowest). Both teams start the game with a Morale rating of 8. If ever a team’s morale is reduced to 0 at the end of either team’s turn, then the forces of that team with Morale of 0 abandon the fight and that team loses (unless the other team’s morale is equally low, in which case the Maoris are considered to have won). Morale ratings can be raised or lowered by Arguments, and are lowered by unsuccessful Desperate Defences. Morale ratings can also be used as Reasons in Arguments (such as “we win the battle because our Morale rating is 3 point higher”).
- If, during a player’s turn the player wishes to attempt a Parry without that Parry counting against the player’s 2 Argument quota for that turn, then the player can make a Desperate Defence. More than one Desperate Defence can be made in a given turn, but no particular Thrust can ever be the subject of more than 1 Parry, whether by Desperate Defence or otherwise. A Desperate Defence is made and resolved in exactly the same manner as any other Parry, except that if the Parry fails, then the player suffers the additional penalty of losing 1 Morale level. In view of the potential importance of Morale in the game, it can be seen that a Desperate defence should only be used either in a true emergency or when the prospects of a successful Parry are so high the risk run is very small.
Note: a Desperate Defence represents the calling upon one’s forces to make a supreme effort to counter a given threat. If this effort is successful, the troops will be encouraged by their success, which will make up for their exhaustion. If the effort fails, however, the troops will be both exhausted and discouraged, hence the drop of Morale.
- Occasionally a player (or players on the same team) turn will make Thrusts on the same turn where one is logically dependant upon the other. For example, a player might make 2 Thrusts in the same turn as follows: 1) that his army moves into enemy territory and locates the enemy force; and 2) that his army beats the now located force. In this example, the second Thrust only makes sense if the first Thrust is at least successful to the extent that the enemy force is located, as the second Thrust assumes that step to have already taken place by a successful first Thrust. In such cases, the Thrusts are said to be “linked”, and will be identified as such by the referee in the results in which the Thrusts are first announced. To resolve linked Thrusts, the referee must adjudicate them so that the first Thrust is determined before the second, and so on down the chain if there are multiple linkages. The referee will then determine at each stage if the necessary precondition for the next argument in the chain to potentially succeed has been satisfied, and if not all subsequent Arguments in the chain will automatically fail, whether there was a Parry attempt or not. It can be seen that linking Thrusts can thus be a wasteful exercise, and generally should be avoided by combining all mutually-dependant matters into the same Thrust.
- Sometimes Thrusts (or Parries, for that matter) are not “linked”, but the success or failure of another might logically affect the probability of the next. In such a case, the referee will adjudicate the Arguments so that, as much as possible, the Arguments that affect the probability of other Arguments are adjudicated first, so that the result of that adjudication can be taken into account in evaluating the affected Argument/s.
Guidelines for Supply and Strategic Movement
Supply is a difficult situation to accurately model without a great deal of paperwork being involved, yet if one neglects it then one’s simulation of colonial warfare such as the present will bear no resemblance to reality. One can keep a record of every ton of supply, every horse, and every wagon at every supply depot, but that is too much of a chore for referee or players and makes for a dull game. There is, however, a much easier way to model the British supply system without going to the extreme of complete abstraction- it still requires some calculation to determine the amount of men tied up in supply duties, but avoids the worst excesses of logistical mathematics. The supply problems faced by the Maori were rather different (although no less severe) and a different treatment is required. Guidelines on how to treat both supply systems will be given accordingly.
Ultimately, however, it is up to the players to decide the detail (or lack thereof) that will be incorporated into supply Arguments, and so anything that is stated here can be no more than a guideline. Players may wish to work out supply to the exact ton, or to deal with the supply issue in only the most general terms. Players are free to devise novel supply arrangements or Argue for different figures than those given due to special factors. Also, there is no rule that automatically penalises the British players in any way if they don’t keep the supplies rolling- if the supply is neglected and the Maori players want to inflict troop losses in consequence, then they will have to Argue for that to happen. Similarly, if the Maori keep their entire potential warrior-force mobilised for 6 months without the British Arguing for adverse consequences, then good luck to the Maori!
In terms of strategic movement, a month is a long time. During such a period, a column of regular troops averaging a mere 10 miles per day (a not atypical rate of advance for regulars during a colonial war assuming reasonable terrain) would march a full 300 miles- and there is no point in the North Island further than 300 miles from Auckland. It is thus supply and not any “movement rate” that dominates the movement of the British during a given month. Unless the British force had pre-deposited supply caches along the way, it would run out of food and be forced to turn back before it had traversed a tiny fraction of the theoretical 300 mile maximum. The Kingite forces are less affected by this problem as they generally travelled in small taua moving through friendly territory, and often employed waka to traverse part of their route by water. A small Maori contingent travelling in such circumstances might indeed cover 300 miles or more in a month. Whilst on such a journey, however, the warriors would neither be able to tend their crops or to fight the enemy, so such long journeys would be a waste of scarce manpower resources of the Maori economy. Also, a large taua of hundreds of warriors might not travel so easily by land as their need for larger quantities of food would complicate supply arrangements on the march, and the warriors might have to spend some substantial part of their time foraging rather than travelling.
The British Situation
The British forces must cope with the moving of supply units to keep their men fed and combat-ready- their numbers are large, their ability to find food in the bush limited, and the ever-present Maori making foraging difficult in any event. Indeed, with the influx of soldiers into the Auckland District for the war, a great reduction in the amount of food that can be purchased from Maori farms, and the decrease in local production due to settlers being called up for militia duty, it is necessary to ship food into Auckland from more peaceful parts of the Colony and Australia just to feed the military units. The ships performing this function are additional to the vessels listed as “naval forces”, and are assumed to continue to ship supplies to Auckland and/or Onehunga and/or Drury- and, similarly, New Plymouth and any other coastal town in which they are required- without that having to be the subject of any Argument. It will be necessary, however, to use the listed assets to transport the supplies onward from the coastal areas to the troops in the field.
Supply Requirements
A company of 50 men will require about 5 tons of food to sustain it per month, but to function properly and at full morale it will also need powder, shot, alcohol, medical supplies, clothing, replacement horses and equipment, mail, officer’s luxuries and similar. Thus 10 tons per month seems a better figure to take all this into account, and if the unit is regularly in action this requirement might double due to wear and tear and high rates of ammunition consumption.
Military supplies are designed to resist spoilage as much as possible, through the use of salting and/or drying, and through sensible storage. Supplies therefore do not have to be consumed, but may be stockpiled for many months. It is wise to place such stockpiles in fortified and garrisoned bases, however, or else they are vulnerable to theft by one’s own side or pillage in Maori raids.
Military units have some inherent capacity to transport supplies with them as they advance. Troops will likely carry on their backs 2 day’s rations, as well as enough powder and shot to last them through a firefight. As a guide, one may assume that military units can carry 2 days’ supply with them without the need for dedicated transport units to accompany them, but beyond that special supply arrangements will need to be made. Assuming an average daily march along a track of about 10 miles, that means a British force could leave its line of supply, march 10 miles, fight a battle, and march 10 miles home without going hungry along the way. If a forced march was involved or a first-class road was available then the ranges might be doubled. Still, it can be seen that an army cannot advance far without a supply line needing to be established.
There are two basic strategies that an army may adopt (or combine) to cope with the supply problem. The first, and most usual, is to establish a supply line to keep the necessary supplies flowing to the striking force of troops leading the advance. This strategy, however, almost inevitably involves large numbers of troops being tied up in rear areas and unable to participate in the main battles of the campaign. The alternative is the use of a “flying column”- an army which casts itself free of any supply line and transports all its supply requirements with it as it marches. Such a flying column might be launched from the army’s supply base or from a depot that it itself at the end of a supply line- in the latter case the two strategies are combined. Both supply lines an flying columns are addressed below.
Establishing a Supply Line
Establishing a supply line involves setting up a route with a series of depots along it, and making provision for the shifting of supplies between those depots. Such depots will almost invariably need to be garrisoned, and may also be fortified. The maximum distance between successive depots is governed by the average daily movement of the type of transport being used, which will in turn depend on the terrain. Wagons might move 15 miles per day along a first class road, and so the depots would have to be not more than 15 miles apart. Along a second class road, this would be reduced to 10 miles and the depots would have to be correspondingly closer.
Having garrisoned supply depots no more than a day’s move apart is rendered a practical necessity for several reasons. Firstly, supply columns are large in size and are hard enough for their escorts to protect during the day without having to spend the night in the open. Secondly, in moving supplies the animals and humans doing the transport work have to be fed, and so a supply column will slowly eat up the supplies it carries as it goes along (I have seen the figure of 3% per day quoted as a general estimate). Animal numbers, the terrain involved, the need for constant movement, and the likelihood that previous columns have already stripped the roadside bare of fodder preclude any possibility of simply letting animals graze for themselves by the side of the road during designated “meal breaks”. If the supply column is away from base for only 2 days at a time, however, most of the column’s food requirement can be consumed at the supply base before leaving on a run or upon return, so the need for the column to consume its own load would be diminished. Thirdly, the demands for supply movement is greater the closer one is to the base- the first section of the supply route must maintain not only the striking force but all the troops and animals involved in the supply system to boot, and the movement requirements then gradually diminish until one reaches the far end of the supply line where one only needs to shift the requirements of the striking force itself. Thus the optimal arrangement is to have a system of supply depots, with a large volume of transport operating between the base and the first depot, somewhat less between the first and second depots, and an ever diminishing volume as one works down the line as the transport and garrisons progressively consume the bulk of the supplies. Indeed, if one did not do this, there would come a point where the supply line was so long that the transport would consume all the supply before it reached the end.
The movement rates of carts along roads has already been mentioned. Lacking roads one must use pack transport, which can move 10 miles per day in good going, and 5 miles per day in difficult terrain. Riverine transport by rowboat is faster, with 20 miles per day quite feasible.
The use of river steamboats is a special case. The river steamboat need have only a small crew, and if it burns wood its fuelling requirements can be met in the field. Thus its supply consumption will be very small, yet its transport capacity will be large as it can not only have supplies stacked on deck but tow a long string of laden barges behind it. Thus river steamboats are a way of transporting large quantities of supply along navigable rivers without burdening the regular supply network of depots and transport columns.
Manpower Requirements of a Supply Line
Each supply depot will require a garrison of a minimum of 1 company to guard and defend the supplies and to mount patrols to defend the route- more if the level of threat is great.
The number of men required to move the supplies on each leg of the supply line (ie between successive depots no more than 1 day’s journey apart) will depend on the quantity of supplies required, which in turn depends on the number of troops that lay beyond that leg of the supply line. For each 10 companies (or part thereof) that lie above a given leg of a supply line, 1 company of troops will be required to transport the supplies over that leg by rowboat or by cart along a road. Pack transport is particularly inefficient (animals can pull much more than they can carry on their backs and so the number of animals involved is much larger), so double the usual number of troops is required on any leg that pack transport is being employed.
The use of steamboats along a navigable river reduces the need for troops along the supply line by taking care of the needs of some of the troops at the end of the line. A small steamboat reduces demands on the supply line by 5 companies, a medium steamboat by 10 companies, and a large steamboat by 20 companies. With a sufficiently small army and enough steamboat transport capacity one might dispense with a conventional supply line altogether, although such a system would be difficult to operate without some sort of bases along the river where the steamboat could stop in safety to obtain wood or repair damage.
By way of example of the maintenance of a supply line, imagine one has a supply line consisting of a seaport, 2 supply depots each garrisoned by 5 companies, and then an army camp containing 60 companies, with each link in the chain no more than a day’s travel from the previous link. There are thus 3 legs in the chain. The last leg caters for the needs of 60 companies, and so 6 companies are required for transport duty on this leg. The second leg must cater for the needs of the 60 companies at the end, the 6 companies on the last leg, and the 5 companies garrisoning the second depot, for a total of 71 companies. Thus 8 companies must be employed on transport duty on the second leg. By similar mathematics, the first leg must supply 84 companies, and so 9 companies must be employed to make the supplies flow. The result is that a Transport Corps of 23 companies (excluding the depot garrisons) is required to keep the 60 companies of the striking force in supply. By this example it can be readily seen that a long supply line will involve the majority of troops in transport and garrisoning duties rather being available for combat at the “front”.
Another example- assume the same set up as above, but the use of a large steamboat to help supply the army. The last supply leg would now only have to cater for 40 companies (60 less the 20 supplied by the steamboat), and so only 4 companies would be required. The second leg would then have only 49 companies to feed, needing 5 transport companies. With 6 companies then needed for the first leg, there would be a total of 15 companies performing supply duties. Thus the use of the large steamer has freed 8 companies for other duties, and the total would have been much greater if the supply line was longer.
“Flying Columns”
A “flying column” of self-supporting troops able to move where they please sounds like a dynamic and attractive solution to the problems inherent in maintaining a supply line, and in some cases is indeed a good solution to that problem, but in most cases the difficulties outweigh the advantages.
The main problem is the fact that however much supply is brought with the flying column, it must eventually run out and the column will have to make sure that it is back at base or connected to a supply line by the time that happens or the troops will starve. This means that unless a supply line can be brought up in the flying column’s wake, or unless there is a “march to the sea” situation in which the flying column is abandoning one supply line to connect itself to another, then the flying column must abandon any territorial gains as rapidly as they are made. Thus a flying column may launch a brief punitive expedition or a “search and destroy” mission, but cannot conquer and hold territory for more than a comparatively brief period. How long this period is will depend largely on the type of transport adopted.
If using animals which consume 3% of their initial load per day, within the space of 1 month the animals will have eaten almost their entire load even if they have no accompanying troops to support. It can be seen that with animal transport, the period for which the flying column can be detached cannot exceed about 2 weeks or the number of animals employed is likely to be much larger than the force can manage. This effectively means the army can march for no more than 1 week away from its supply line before being forced to retreat- a maximum of 70 miles in good going unless forced marches are being employed.
Using a fleet of large rowing boats to accompany the army carrying supplies might be a viable alternative if the axis of advance is along a navigable river. Given that there are no animals to feed, an army might be able to sustain itself for an entire month with the supplies thus carried (such as 2 weeks advancing upstream and 2 weeks retreating downstream). The price, however, is paid in strategic flexibility. Not only is the axis of advance confined to a navigable river, but the army’s capacity to move of that axis is very limited as there will be no animals available to carry supplies by land. Thus the army will be unable to attack any target more than 10 miles from the river (the distance they can carry supplies on their own backs and have enough for a return trip)- and even a march of this distance will require a substantial force to be left behind to guard the vital boats and their precious contents.
A second problem is that flying columns are inherently very risky. If the army is delayed for any reason- enemy action, natural phenomena, or any other manifestation of the “friction” that dogs all military operations- then the army is likely to run low on supplies and be forced to retreat before reaching its goal. If the retreat path is blocked, then the whole force risks annihilation. Also, the army has placed all its eggs in one basket, and if the supplies or transport it has brought with it are captured or destroyed then there is no way of bringing up any more. Finally, if the army suffers significant casualties then there is no way to evacuate them- the army will either be immobilised until the sick or wounded recover or it must cart them around behind it until they are jolted to death.
Thirdly, the sheer quantity of animals or boats needed to be accumulated in one place can seriously hamper operations and pose a security nightmare. For example, animal transport sufficient to supply 1 company for the 2 week operation will take up approximately 100 yards of road. If there are 120 companies (6,000 men), the troops themselves will take up about 2 miles of road and the baggage another 8 miles. With the troops marching 10 miles per day, that will mean that the end of the column will only just be leaving the old camp as the head of the column is reaching the new camp. The army must thus choose between distributing the troops strength evenly along the length of the column and thus leaving almost nothing up front to fight the enemy, or providing a large advance guard at the expense of leaving the rest of the column scarcely protected. The problem is far worse if no road is available and one is using pack animals in single file- the column would theoretically be strung out over 40 miles and thus three-quarters of the force will still be in the old camp after the lead elements have reached the new camp, and there are unlikely to be enough daylight hours to complete the march.
The Maori Situation
The Maori are also dependent upon supply, but as their numbers are much smaller than the British; their needs are simpler; they are fighting in friendly territory; they can obtain much of their requirements through “living off the land”; and supply can be carried to many places by canoe as part and parcel of the movement of the warriors themselves, transport of supply to the warrior will not be too much of a problem in most circumstances. If, however, a large force (say more than 500) is assembled in the same place and kept stationary for a long period (say more than 1 month), then problems could potentially arise, depending on circumstances. If the force is in or close to a major area of Maori food cultivation (which are marked on the regional maps), then a concentration of as many as 2,000 warriors might be supplied over a sustained period. If the force is not close to a cultivation but is connected to one by river or road, then 1,000 -1,500 man concentrations might still be achievable.
The main problem for the Maori is that their system of food production requires the labour of Maori warriors from time to time if it is to function properly. This is particularly so in the August/September planting season. Thus if an extended family sends its warriors to war for more than a couple of months at a time, the family is likely to go hungry as food consumption exceeds food production. If the “front” was fairly close to home, a system could be implemented whereby each warrior would spend a period at the front before being relieved by another warrior and then returning home for a while to help with the crops before returning once again to war. By this means a force equal to one half to two-thirds of the warrior pool (depending on proximity and ease of access to the “front”) might be kept continually in action- although the composition of the force would continually change as individuals came and went. A larger force might be assembled for a month or two, but then the force would disintegrate as the great majority were forced simultaneously to return home to their families (similarly a smaller force than permitted might be kept in the field to allow the entire warrior pool to be mustered for a longer period in time of real need). In the case of warriors living a long distance from the fighting, only a fraction of an iwi’s total strength could be sent (perhaps one third) as the long travel time would make any system of regular replacement difficult.
The Maori can make their own shot without difficulty, but have limited facilities to manufacture gunpowder, can only crudely improvise with respect to percussion caps, and have no capacity to manufacture new firearms. As, however, the British gave ample notice of their hostile intentions through the building of the new road to Queen’s Redoubt, the Maori have had plenty of opportunity to stockpile weapons and ammunition, and have taken full advantage of that opportunity. Nevertheless, a protracted war is likely to cause ammunition shortages unless resupply can be obtained through trade with neutral tribes maintaining commercial relations with the Pakeha and thus able to procure weapons and ammunition. Fortunately for the Maori, however, many “neutral” tribes are highly sympathetic to Kingitanga, and are likely to be the vehicles for such trade.