“ My Friend, I will Fight You Forever, Forever”
The Waikato War, 1863-4
It is 2 April 1864. 200 determined men are defending a small, unfinished fort, no more than 80 feet by 40 feet in size and containing 50 women and children. The enemy have surrounded the fort for 3 days. More than 1,000 strong, the enemy have flung themselves at the tiny fort time after time. Three times the onrushing hordes have been thrown back by the tiny garrison, but now ammunition is low, and water has run out entirely. A relieving force has tried to break the siege, but to no avail- the enemy are simply too numerous. The garrison are cut off, completely isolated. They must whittle their bullets from wood, and suck the moisture from raw potatoes.
The enemy is crafty- they have dug a trench to within a few feet of the garrison, and are throwing improvised grenades into the fort. A few men of the garrison, the bravest of the brave, run to catch the grenades, pulling out the fuses before they explode- vital powder to keep the defence going. Other grenades they throw back, bursting amongst the besieging multitude. But how long can the defenders hold out?
There is a pause in the fighting. The attackers ask for the small garrison to surrender to save their lives. But, hopeless as their position appears to be, the leader of the garrison replies that he will never surrender. This unexpected defiance excites the wrath of the besiegers. Now the attackers make use of their deadliest weapon- a small artillery piece dragged up to the very brink of the fort and fired into it at point-blank range. The defenders must now take refuge in their bunkers to weather the galling fire. But now the gun falls silent and two more assaults are flung against the fort in succession- both are repulsed, but the cost to the garrison is mounting.
The garrison’s defiant leader knows that he will have to attempt a breakout. Each man has reserved a single cartridge for this final act. Rising from their trenches, the garrison charge towards the enemy, the men forming a tight square around the women and children. The sheer impetus of the charge breaks through a double-line of the enemy, and the garrison seems through and clear. But immediately a pursuit is mounted. Dodging through bush and swamp, the escaping garrison is harried constantly, even women and children falling to the bullets and blades of the merciless hordes- and once fallen a man, woman or child was unlikely to rise again, as the enemy showed no pity to the wounded. More than half of those defenders who had survived the siege are lost in the pursuit. Yet there are many survivors- including their leader and the honour of their race…
Does this story sound familiar? It is much like many tales of adventure of the Boys Own Adventure variety where a small British garrison holds out against impossible odds against the native hordes. And ,yes, once again this is a story of British soldiers fighting the natives. Yet this story has a difference. For, you see, this time the British are the overwhelming hordes and the natives- Maori warriors to be precise- are the brave and long-suffering garrison…
“My friend, I will fight you forever, forever”- a translation of the defiant words of Rewi Maniapoto, the leader of the garrison in the story told above, when he refused the surrender offered by the British General Cameron. The place was Orakau, New Zealand. A stirring tale indeed, and a strange one to most students of colonial warfare. Yet a stranger thing is that this role-reversal between colonial power and indigenous people was not an isolated occurrence in the New Zealand Wars- on the contrary the British were almost always the numerically-overwhelming attackers and the Maoris the beleaguered garrison trusting in their skills in fortification.
Strangest of all, however, is that the Maori performance at Orakau was actually one of their worst in the Wars. For example at the Battle of Gate Pa, occurring later the same month, 235 Maoris faced a Britsh force of 1,700 regulars and experienced an artillery bombardment 20 times more intense in terms of shell-weight per square yard than that British opening bombardment at the Somme. Not only did the Maori survive the bombardment, but they then proceeded to rout the subsequent full-scale simultaneous British assault on front and rear of their entrenchments, inflicting 111 casualties on the British compared to about 20 Maori lost in the entirety of the battle. The Maori then slipped out of their virtually surrounded position at night without further loss.
Maori Glossary
Aotearoa: “The Land of the Long White Cloud”; Niu Tireni or New Zealand
Hapu: A sub-group within an iwi; a sub-tribe. Some Hapu were many hundreds strong, whilst others consisted of but a few extended families.
Iwi: A major tribe, or confederation of smaller tribes.
Kingitanga: The “King Movement”; an autonomous Maori organisation headed by a Maori monarch.
Kumara: Sweet potato, the main traditional Maori crop.
Kupapa: Pro-British or “Queenite” Maori.
Mana: Semi-magical authority derived from force of personality, great deeds, and proper attention to spiritual matters.
Mere: A one-handed bladed war-club.
Pa: A Maori fortification consisting of earthworks and sometimes supplemented by a palisade.
Pakeha: A person not of Maori race.
Pakeha-Maori: A Pakeha who lives with the Maori and has adopted Maori culture, at least in part.
Pekerangi: A light wooden fence surrounding a pa and constituting the outermost line of defence,
serving to delay attackers and sometimes to support flax matting screening the pa from outside observation.
Pounamu: A type of jade found on the South Island highly prized by Maori and used to fashion ornaments and the most distinguished mere; “greenstone”.
Rangitira: A Maori chief or some sort. Some rangitira commanded an entire iwi, some a hapu, and others only an extended family group.
Tapu: Sacred and forbidden.
Tohunga: A Maori greatly learned in traditional lore; a witch-doctor, medicine-man, shaman or sorcerer.
Taua: A Maori war-band or army.
Tupara: A double-barrelled small arm, usually a shotgun or musket.
Utu: The Maori principle of reciprocality, repaying kindness with kindness and insult with insult. Utu often led to lasting alliances or vendettas between iwi.
Waikato: (1) the Waikato River (also known as the “Horotiu” below the junction with it major tributary, the Waipa); (2) the region through which the Waikato and its tributaries flow; (3) an iwi consisting of a group of tribes living on the lower and middle reaches of the Waikato- sometimes known as “Waikato Proper”; (4) The iwi Ngati Haua, Ngati Maniapoto, Waikato Proper, and the northern branch of Ngati Ruakawa; all of which live in the Waikato region.
Waka: Maori canoe. May be anything from a small, one person canoe, up to a giant war canoe capable of carrying more than 100 warriors.
The North Island of New Zealand in 1863, with inset showing part of the North Taranaki region.
Basic Information
What was the Waikato War?
The Waikato War was the largest of the conflicts known as the “New Zealand Wars” or the “Maori Wars” which took place in mid to late 19th Century New Zealand between segments of the indigenous Maori population, and the Pakeha (non-Maori) British and colonial troops aided by their own Maori allies known as “Queenite” Maori or “kupapa”. The Waikato War lasted for a period of approximately 12 months from 11 June 1863. It was a war primarily (but not exclusively) fought in the Waikato region- a comparatively flat region in the interior of the North Island of New Zealand dominated by the Waikato River and its largest tributary, the Waipa. The British invaded this region in an attempt to defeat a Maori coalition known as “Kingitanga” (“the King Movement”) which drew its core support from the region’s tribes (iwi)., the largest of which was Waikato Proper, the tribe of the Maori King, .
Historically, the British failed to destroy Kingitanga, (indeed, the movement is still alive and healthy today under the Maori Queen, Te Arikunui ) but made considerable inroads into the territory under its control, and seized some of its most productive land. The cost of the great number of troops that were needed to achieve this outcome, however, far exceeded the fruits of the war (in terms of sales of confiscated land), leaving the local Colonial Government in serious debt to the Imperial Government in Britain (there being a “user pays” system of financing colonial wars at that time). Although the Imperial Government was persuaded to forgive this debt, it was at the price of the withdrawal of all Imperial troops, the Colony of New Zealand having, in future, to assume total military responsibility for all future Maori wars. This led in turn to considerable difficulty for the Colony in fighting a new round of battles with the Maori in 1868-9, this time against the followers of two Maori prophets, Te Kooti and Titokawaru.
What was New Zealand Like in 1863?
New Zealand consists of two principal islands of similar size, usually known as the “North Island” and the “South Island”- although the respective Maori names of Te Ika a Maui (“Maui’s fish”) and Te Wahi Pounamu (“The Place of Greenstone”) are more colourful. The islands lie between 34 and 47 degrees south, so are classified as “temperate”. For those more familiar with Northern Hemisphere geography, Italy lies approximately between the equivalent northern latitudes. New Zealand’s climate, however, is strongly influenced by the fact that it is an island nation, and is exposed to the strong westerly winds known as the “Roaring 40s”. The surrounding ocean moderates the seasons, whilst the winds bring plentiful rain. The fact that the two main islands span a distance of some 1,500 km north to south means that there is considerable climatic variation between the extremities- in the northern reaches of the North Island there is no true winter, whilst in the southern reaches of the South Island the winters can be quite severe with extensive snowfalls. In the North Island (in which the Waikato is located), snowfalls are normally confined to the slopes of Mount Taranaki (also known as Mount Egmont) and to the high central plateau which contains the remainder of the island’s high mountains, including the highest, Mount Ruapehu.
All mountains in the North Island of any consequence are volcanic, and those in the central plateau (including Mount Ruapehu) are active. In 186 CE the largest recorded eruption in human history took place on the island (recorded in China and Greece, as the impact was worldwide)- which blasted a hole in the middle of the North Island some 30 kilometres wide and created New Zealand’s largest lake, Lake Taupo. A much smaller (yet still impressive) eruption took place in 1886 a little further north at Mount Tarawera, burying a Maori village and rearranging a nearby lake. A major fault line runs through the centre of the island on a north-south axis, and earthquakes are common.
Most of the North Island is hilly, and in
some places the hills are very rugged. In 1863, the great majority of the
island is forested- in many places with rainforest consisting of native ferns
and timber- which makes access all the more difficult. At this date, the Pakeha
settlements are essentially confined to a few coastal areas of the
In 1860, there were 79,000 Pakeha in the whole of New Zealand, compared to perhaps 55,000 Maori. Due to the fact that the great majority of Maori lived in the warmer North Island, the racial balance in 1863 in the North Island would have been fairly even, with about 50,000 Maori and 50,000 Pakeha. In the 3 years since 1860, however, a major gold rush had occurred in the South Island’s southerly Otago region, with tens of thousands pouring into Otago in a few short years whilst the population of the North Island remained fairly stable. This development has given the South Island the larger Pakeha population and a correspondingly greater political influence. In consequence, there is a move afoot to relocate the capital of New Zealand from its 1863 location at Auckland to Wellington at the southerly tip of the North Island, where it is more readily accessible to South Island residents.
Constitutionally, 19th Century New Zealand was a colony of Great Britain, but from 1852 was allowed a degree of self-government. As at 1863, New Zealand is governed by a governor, Sir George Grey, who is supervised by the Colonial Office in London, and advised by ministers appointed by a Parliament elected by New Zealand voters (who were, at this time, almost exclusively Pakeha). Although this double check on the Governor’s authority should have greatly limited his power, the Colonial Office was half a world away and, as there was no telegraph line linking New Zealand and London at that time, the Colonial Secretary received a limited flow of information- all of which was months out of date at the very least- and so had to leave most of the decisions to the man on the spot. Parliament came to be the main governing institution in New Zealand, but as at 1863 it was divided by regional issues (with each province having its own highly separately-elected provincial government) and no political parties had yet formed, the result being a an unstable set of shifting alliances and short-lived ministries. In these circumstances the experienced and determined Governor found little difficulty in governing the Pakeha-dominated regions of New Zealand as he saw fit. As for the Maori, they happily traded with the Pakeha, but generally observed their own laws and customs, and were governed by their own chiefs.
How Did the British Fight the Maori?
Generally the British sought to find the Maori and defeat them in a decisive battle. This was, indeed, the central doctrine adopted by colonial powers in their wars of empire- matters of strategy favoured the “natives” and matters of tactics favoured the regular troops. In other words, the natives could live easily off the land and disappear into the jungle whenever they liked, but if British troops could only catch up with them the result would be a great victory for British arms. The British did not want to invest thousands of troops in a search-and-destroy type of guerrilla war lasting many years (nor did the concept of burning down unprotected Maori villages appeal to their sense of honour), so they needed to either attack the Maori warriors wherever they gathered in force, or to force the Maori to come out and fight. The result usually involved the Maori constructing and garrisoning a pa (a Maori fort)- either to block a British advance or as a secure base for raiding Pakeha territory- and the British attacking it. The British also had to develop techniques to defend their supply lines and Pakeha settlements against Maori attack- this was usually accomplished by a combination of the construction and manning of redoubts and the despatch of strong patrols to hunt down any Maori taua (war party) in the area.
In 1863, the British troops carried as their standard infantry weapon the Enfield muzzle-loading rifle. This was a weapon very similar to the Springfield rifle that was the main infantry weapon of the American Civil War- it had an extreme range of around 900 yards. Although its range was approximately three times that of the smoothbore weapons that made up a large part of the Maori armoury, the Enfield was slower to load in close-combat as its bullet needed to be rammed home with a ramrod (meaning a maximum of 2-3 shots per minute) whilst a smoothbore shotgun (and a smoothbore musket, albeit at considerable loss of accuracy) could be tap-loaded (the butt being tapped on the ground to jolt the powder and projectile down the barrel), allowing up to 5 shots per minute. As in bush-fighting most shooting took place at less than 100 yards range, the Enfield, although the technologically superior weapon was not necessarily the better weapon in terms of performance on New Zealand battlefields. Carbines and revolvers were made available for specially-recruited bush-fighting units, which was an acknowledgement of the sense of the Maori approach of using shorter-ranged weapons with a higher rate of fire.
The British also used artillery against the Maori, mainly to bombard pa as a preliminary to an assault. British artillery in New Zealand was mainly based around the rifled breach-loading Armstrong gun, although mortars (and howitzers) were also much-used due to their ability to fire at a higher angle and thus have a better chance of inflicting casualties on entrenched troops. The Armstrongs would have had a range in the thousands of yards, but there was no need to fire at a range greater than 1,000 yards as the Maori had nothing that could reply at that distance (indeed, the Maori would have had few weapons capable of hitting anything beyond 300 yards). The usual projectile fired from British artillery was the explosive shell.
How Did the Maori Fight the British?
By the time the New Zealand became a British colony in 1840, the Maori had already several decades of experience with the Pakeha. Although introduced diseases had killed many thousands, and introduced firearms had sparked off ruinous inter-tribal wars (known as the “Musket Wars”), by 1840 the Maori had developed some immunity to the diseases and had plentiful experience with firearms. The Maori proved to be extremely rapid learners and able improvisers, and soon developed techniques of warfare that would prove to be at the cutting edge of 19th Century military practice. They were also very brave, yet not foolhardy- they fought tenaciously and at great odds, but would not throw away their lives in futile-yet-glorious charges. Finally, they were masters of the art of field fortification.
Maoris always had a penchant for
fortification. Traditionally they built palisades and ditches around a
hillcrest, headland or island located close to their villages to create as a
place of refuge in the case of enemy attack. In consequence, much traditional
Maori warfare involved the besieging of pa, although raids and ambushes also
featured prominently. Traditional weapons included the throwing spear, a wooden staff-like weapons, and various forms of one-handed
club made out of wood, bone or stone. The most distinguished of weapons was the
mere, a small, flat club with blunt bladed edges, and if made of the
prized greenstone of the
Prior to the coming if the musket, the defence of a pa was aided by the construction of one or more fighting platforms over the palisade from which the defenders could rain spears down on the attackers from a height. After muskets became common, however, fighting platforms were abandoned as the warriors atop them could be easily picked off by gunfire. Instead, the bases of the palisades were loopholed so that muskets could be fired from a trench dug immediately behind them. Soon many of the complexities of Pakeha gunpowder fortifications were rediscovered by the Maori in the course of the Musket Wars, including corner bastions and the “traversing” of trenches to reduce the possibility of enfilade fire. The Maori also invented new techniques, such as the building of a type of rail fence called a pekerangi a few yards in front of the line of palisades to slow down a storming party (in a similar way that barbed wire would be used in WWI), and the construction out of earth and fern tall musketry towers either outside a pa to dominate its defences or inside to fire down on the attackers over the palisades.
By the end of the Musket Wars, all iwi had accumulated considerable number of guns, and further supplanted their supplies from trade after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. Originally supplied mainly with cheap trade muskets, the Maori soon became more discriminating in their trade and many refused to accept these inferior goods- although some liked the trade musket as being quicker and easier to load than the military musket, and more robust. The Maori thus came to possess a great variety of weapons, including the most modern percussion military muskets and shotguns. The most favoured weapon was the tupara- meaning a double-barrelled musket or shotgun. Occasionally even artillery pieces were acquired, mainly from shipwrecks. Although some Maori preferred to snipe from a distance with a long-range precision firearm, the general preference was for a weapon that could produce rapid and devastating fire at close range- such as against attackers storming a pa or in a close ambush situation.
During the 1846-6 Northern War against British troops, the rangitira Hone Heke and Kawiti encountered for the first time the major use of artillery against their pa. These rangitira, however, very rapidly adapted their pa to compensate. Flax sheets were hung from the pekerangi through which artillery projectiles could pass but which obstructed line of sight, making aiming difficult and accurate assessment of damaged caused to the pa all but impossible. Underground storage pits were modified to act as artillery bunkers with overhead cover- sometimes with loopholes to allow defenders in the pits to fire up at attackers who had entered the pa. The pits were then joined with each other and the trenches by winding underground passages so that the Maori could move to any point within their pa in the maximum of safety. When hiding within such a system of dugouts, the Maori were safe from almost anything the British could fire at them, and even if a shell scored a direct on their overhead cover and penetrated into a bunker, the winding nature of the passages contained the blast to a fairly small area and thus minimised casualties.
It was standard Maori practice to abandon a purpose-built fighting pa after a battle- even if it was the site of a major victory. This was partly out of a belief that the pa was now tapu- sacred ground consecrated by the blood of the dead that should not be profaned by the living. There were also strategic reasons for this practice, however. The British expended great time and effort marching troops and dragging equipment up to attack a pa, and then setting up batteries, accumulating enough ammunition for a bombardment, etc. If the Maori were able to abandon the pa without major loss to themselves and go off and construct a new fighting pa elsewhere, then the British would be put to much greater trouble than if the Maori stayed put in the old pa. To this end, modern pa were almost always constructed with at least one side fronting on difficult terrain that could be used as an escape route when the time was ripe. The Maori defenders of a pa would usually stay to face the first major British assault (in the hope of inflicting major casualties), but had few qualms about abandoning the pa prior to such an assault if the position was considered too weak.
The favourite method of strategic movement for the Maori was the waka or canoe. Waka came in all sizes. The largest waka taua (war canoes) were made out of several large hollowed-out tree-trunks joined end to end, and were designed to carry 100 or more warriors for short distances, and smaller numbers for longer voyages. Small sails could be hoisted to make short sea voyages easier- such as the passage of Cook Strait between the North and the South Island. Waka were not fully seaworthy and liable to capsize in a storm (they did not have outriggers or double hulls like Polynesian long-distance canoes), but if the crews made sure they stayed close to land, the waka could shelter in a bay or be drawn up a beach if the seas became heavy.
A Brief History of New Zealand to 1863
Early New Zealand History
The islands which came to be known as New Zealand by the Pakeha and Aotearoa (meaning “Land of the Long White Cloud”) by the Maori were uninhabited before the Polynesians arrived and settled the islands over the period 900-1300 AD. These Polynesians- the forefathers of the Maori- were primarily agriculturalists brought with them a variety of crops from tropical islands to the north, but many of these crops failed to grow in the cooler climate of New Zealand, or would only grow on the northern extremity of the North Island. The kumara (sweet potato), however, was suitable for the temperate climate of the North Island and the northern tip of the South Island, and became the main staple of the Maori. Further south, agriculture was not possible and only a comparatively small population of hunter-gatherers could be sustained- thus the great majority of Maori came to live on the North Island.
The first Pakeha contact with the Maori occurred in 1654 when Abel Tasman discovered the islands and shot at some Maori canoes that ventured too close. In1770, Captain James Cook visited and introduced the pig to the islands- previously the Maoris had their meat supply confined to birds, fish, eels, shellfish, and an introduced Polynesian rat. Following Cook’s visit, New Zealand (known to the Maori as “Aotearoa”, meaning “Land of the Long White Cloud”) came to be visited by a variety of Pakeha, in increasing numbers as the years went on. By the end of the 18th Century, whaling stations had been set up at various places on the coast of both main islands by both British and Americans, and a French expedition had also visited (with some of its members captured and eaten). The whalers traded with the Maori to obtain supplies, and the latter soon developed a taste for Pakeha firearms.
With their new-found weapons, those Maori iwi fortunate enough to have access to Pakeha were able to raid enemy iwi with impunity, capturing slaves which were then employed to produce more tradable commodities to barter for more guns. The result were the bloody “Musket Wars”, which lasted from approximately 1818 to 1840, in which many iwi migrated large distances to avoid destruction by musket-equipped enemies. During this period, obtaining guns could be essential to tribal survival, and so Pakeha trading partners were much sought-after. Canny Maori rangitira encouraged small Pakeha settlements of missionaries, whalers, or farmers in their tribal lands to ensure uninterrupted trade. War tactics and methods of fortification changed rapidly as all iwi came to possess their share of muskets and learned to adapt to the potentialities of gunpowder. Eventually a near-parity in musket-power was arrived at, and the Musket Wars effectively ceased, but not before large tracts of land had been left all-but-deserted by war casualties, wholesale enslavement, and migration.
The casualties of war were supplemented by the deaths of many thousands from introduced Pakeha diseases. Although the Maori appear to have suffered far less than many other isolated peoples from introduced diseases, by 1840 the combined effects of war and disease approximately halved the estimated 18th Century population of 120,000. Maori population figures declined gradually over the next 56 years (they dipped to an historical low-point of 46,000 in 1896), but by 1840 the worst ravages of first contact were over.
The Treaty of Waitangi
Concerned at the possibility that the French might claim the islands, and feeling a moral duty to attempt to govern a land that was becoming influenced by increasing numbers of English-speaking Pakeha that would otherwise be beyond any European law, the British persuaded the Maori in the far north of the North Island to accept British sovereignty. This acceptance was embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, which was written in the Maori language (by this time many Maori were literate in their own language, and there was a growing number of works published in Maori, most from missionary presses). After the initial signing, copies of the Treaty were taken around New Zealand to obtain as many further chiefly signatures as possible. Many signed, but some refused. Most notable amongst those who refused were the chiefs of the Waikato tribes.
The chiefs who signed did so for a variety of reasons. Some seemingly did not understand the importance of their act, and were induced by presents offered to those who signed to compensate them for their trouble. Many were anxious for closer relations with the Pakeha, as despite the ending of the Musket Wars, Pakeha trade was still greatly prized. Some may have feared that if the British were rebuffed, the French might not be so friendly. Many tribes were worn out from the Musket Wars and perhaps considered that a British presence was the best way of keeping the peace. Finally, the Treaty was generous in its preservation of Maori rights and chiefly authority- but its Maori signatories were not to know that the British were working from a translation into English that did not preserve important concepts present in the Maori original. Of course, it was the British interpretation of the Treaty that came to be implemented by New Zealand’s government- at least until the latter years of the 20th Century.
Hone Heke’s Northern War
As the main point of contact between Pakeha and Maori had been in the Bay of Islands near the northern tip of the North Island, it was no surprise that the first capital of New Zealand was located on the shores of the Bay. In the immediate wake of the treaty, however, thousands of settlers from Britain arrived in New Zealand to establish new towns, the largest of which was Auckland, which had access to several excellent harbours. Thus Auckland rapidly eclipsed the Bay of Islands as the entrepot for maritime trade, and the capital was moved there in 1842. To make matters worse for the inhabitants of the Bay, large customs duties were imposed on the limited trade that remained.
Hone Heke was one of the most important rangitira of the Ngapuhi iwi. The Ngapuhi had profited more than most in the Musket Wars (and bear the major responsibility for starting and continuing those wars), and strongly encouraged Pakeha settlement in the Bay of Islands area to meet their desire for trade in muskets and other goods. Heke was one of the first to sign the Treaty of Waitangi, as was his ally and fellow Ngapuhi rangitira, Kawiti. Both chiefs could reasonably have expected that the signing of the Treaty would bring a new era of ever-increasing Pakeha trade, yet within two years the Bay of Islands was almost deserted by Pakeha shipping. To make matters worse, the Pakeha in the Bay’s major settlement, Korarareka, were apparently now rejecting Heke’s benevolent chiefly authority (benevolent as Pakeha were such a valuable resource to the trade-hungry Ngapuhi). This rejection was symbolized by the flying of the Union Jack from a large flagstaff on a hill above Korarareka. Under this flag, trade was evaporating and the Pakeha were attempting to make rules that told Heke what he could and could not do on his own land. The Pakeha were telling him he could not cut down certain trees, yet when Heke in turn designated trees growing on consecrated ground as tapu, the Pakeha would not listen. Clearly the Pakeha needed to be taught a lesson, yet without harming any of the people Heke referred to with affection as “my Pakeha”.
Hone Heke thus went to the flagstaff and chopped it down. When it was re-erected, he chopped it down again. Erected a third time and a permanent guard placed on it, Heke drove away the guards and felled the flagstaff once more. The British then brought in soldiers and a naval brigade, raised a local militia, re-erected the flagstaff, and built a set of blockhouses guarding both staff and town. On 11 March 1845, Heke and Kawiti determined to take sterner action, mustering around 300 of their men, storming the blockhouses, and chopping down the flagstaff for a fourth time. In the process, they captured Kororareka itself, despite the fact that its blockhouses and other defences were garrisoned by 140 soldiers, sailors and marines, backed up by 200 armed civilians. The British, after having evacuated most of the town’s citizens, bombarded it from their warships in the Bay, setting it alight in the process. After a period of looting, the Maori withdrew.
The British were intent on punishing the “rebellious” Maori, and thus shipped a punitive expedition to the Bay, which then marched on Heke’s economic base, which was defended by a number of pa. The British force were supplemented by several hundred Ngapuhi under Tamati Waka Nene, a rangatira who tried unsuccessfully to dissuade Heke from war with the Pakeha, and who presumably believed that fighting the Pakeha was not a good way to improve commercial relations. Waka Nene’s Maori were used mainly for scouting, raiding Heke’s villages and similar irregular warfare, whilst the British soldiers and sailors concentrated upon meeting and defeating the rebel Maori warriors in battle. As these warriors defied the British from their pa, it was the pa that the British targeted, in an attempt to storm the pa and inflict a quick, decisive defeat which would cause the rebels to come to terms without the need for difficult and protracted “search and destroy” missions through the bush.
The first attempt on one of Heke’s pa was made on 22 April at Puketutu, which was defended by 200 of Heke’s men and 140 of Kawiti’s, and attacked by 300 regular infantry and 140 sailors and marines. Attempting to storm a weak point in the defences accessible via bushland to the rear of the pa, the British were attacked by a band of Kawiti’s men advancing unseen through the bush, and then by a sortie from the garrison. In bloody fighting the British were repulsed, with about 50 casualties being lost on each side. The British made no further storming attempt, but occupied the strategically valueless pa when the Maori garrison abandoned it in accordance with their usual custom.
After a major raid mounted by Waka Nene’s men (at Te Ahuahu on 8 May) was successful against superior numbers of Heke’s warriors, the Pakeha were encouraged to strike against one of Kawiti’s pa. On 23 June, 615 British troops accompanied by 4 light cannon and screened by Waka Nene’s warriors, arrived at Ohaewai Pa, which was garrisoned by a mere 100 of Kawiti’s men, including the rangitira himself. A bombardment of the pa took place, but after little progress was made over six days, and in the face of accurate sniping and sallies from the garrison, the bombardment was called off (after a brief experiment with lobbing “stench bombs” into the pa from mortars) until a heavier gun arrived from the coast. As soon as the 32 pounder cannon arrived and commenced firing, Kawiti launched a major attack on another battery position manned by Waka Nene’s men and a British picket, capturing a 6 pounder and a British flag. Kawiti then ran the captured flag up his own flagstaff, but placed it beneath his own war flag. Stung by the insult, the British Colonel Despard pounded the pa with the 32 pounder until he had run out of ammunition for the heavy cannon, and then ordered a storming party to attack, despite the fact that the flax matting hung from a light fence around the pa (the “pekerangi”) made it difficult to asses the extent of the breach in the palisading. The subsequent storming attempt was a complete disaster, with the storming party finding there was, in fact, no breach to assault, and they were raked by concentrated Maori fire as they endeavoured to create one with their own hands. Their job was further complicated by the fact that the Maori had 5 cannon installed in the pa (4 former ships’ guns of their own, of various sizes, and the captured 6 pounder), and one of these was sited in a projecting bastion near the British assault and, loaded with a bullock-chain, was able to enfilade the assault party at point blank range with unpleasant consequences for the British. The result was a bloody repulse, with more than 110 British casualties to no more than 10 Maori dead throughout the entire siege. Colonel Despard contemplated immediate retreat, but was persuaded by Wake Nene to stay at least until the dead were buried. Soon after, however, the Maori abandoned the pa, and the British (with some difficulty, such was its strength) demolished it before retreating.
There was then a lull in the fighting as peace was explored, but with nothing agreed the British landed large reinforcements in December to bring their force up to 1,300 men, excluding their kupapa allies under Waka Nene. They were equipped with 6 heavy artillery pieces, 5 lighter guns and 2 rocket tubes. This force proceeded to march on Ruapekapeka, Kawiti’s largest pa, which was defended by 400 of his warrior. On 10 January 1846, the British, after having systematically setting up their batteries over the course of many days, commenced an all-out bombardment of the pa, creating 3 breaches. On the same day, however, Hone Heke arrived with 60 men to support Kawiti, having slipped past a force of kupapa deployed to block his way. The next day the pa was found to be apparently abandoned, but when a force of British troops was sent in to occupy it, Kawiti and a dozen warriors fired a volley at them and ran out the back. The British gave chase, but quickly they found themselves in a Maori trap, fired upon from fortified ambush positions in close bushland. The result could have been serious for the British, but a rumour sprang up amongst the Maori that Kawiti captured, causing many warriors to lose control an attempt to retake the pa to liberate their chief. The British, repulsed the Maori counter-attack, returned to the pa and could not be lured out again, and so the Maoris retreated. Once more the British had captured an inherently valueless pa with the Maoris escaping without serious casualties- about 30 dead and wounded to the British 45. The British themselves then quickly abandoned Ruapekapeka, and, constantly fearful of attack, returned to the coast with such speed that they abandoned equipment and ammunition so as to not impede their progress.
By this time, both sides were becoming exhausted by their martial efforts, and peace was soon concluded that saved face on both sides. Heke and Kawiti made a nominal submission, whilst the Colonial Government under Governor George Grey pardoned all “rebel” and allowed them to keep their plunder from Kororareka. The flagstaffat Kororareka remained down- indeed it was not re-erected until 1858 when the Ngapuhi presented the town with a new staff as a gesture of reconciliation with the Pakeha. The customs duties had already been reduced in an attempt to placate Heke. The two “rebel” chiefs remained the major powers in the Bay of Islands. To prove his power, Heke marched into the rebuilt Korarareka (which was renamed “Russell”) with a large military force in late 1846, removed the remains of his men that had fallen in his previous capture of the town, and then peacefully retired. Governor Grey contented himself with a claim that the rebels had been forced to sue for peace after their defeat at Ruapekapeka, and that the Government had merely been magnanimous in its victory. Thus, in a sense, it was the Maori who had won the victory, yet the Government reaped a lasting benefit as the Ngapuhi iwi never warred against the Pakeha again, and during the Waikato War were it was considered one of the few “Queenite” tribes.
Land Sales and Kingitanga
Although the 15 years from the end of the Northern War to 1860 involved some small local conflicts between Maori and Pakeha, race relations were comparatively peaceful. Pakeha areas of settlement slowly expanded by new land being purchased from the Maori, rather than by the use of force. The problem was, however, that the quantity of comparatively vacant yet arable land steadily diminished, and the Pakeha needed to ensure the supply continued in order to promote further settlers to emigrate to the colony. Thus increasingly the purchasers were forced to attempt to arrange land purchases from large groups of Maori who claimed ownership of it. Some of the “owners” would inevitably object, and as to some extent all land was held in common and so one could not simply purchase the blocks of the willing sellers, it was then necessary to continue negotiations until there was unanimous consent to sell.
As time went on, the Pakeha became increasingly frustrated by the difficulties of land purchase, and so tried to cut corners by seeking only the consent of the Maori in direct physical occupation of the land to be sold, and not those who claimed some more remote right. This alarmed the Maori rangitira as the British were no longer obtaining their consent to buy tribal land. As the purchase of land involved an influx of Pakeha onto the land along with Pakeha institutions that did not acknowledge a rangitira’s right to continue to govern that land, land sales effectively shifted sovereignty from Maori to Pakeha.
Faced with steady erosion of their authority, the rangitira decided to confederate so as to put up a common front against land sales. Also, many Maori felt they needed their own government as Queen Victoria and her colonial government seemed to be acting only in the interests of her Pakeha subjects, appointing only Pakeha to government positions and spending almost all government funds in the Pakeha areas of settlement. Although a Maori had equal voting rights to a Pakeha in electing the government, there was a minimum property qualification on voting and “Maori title” to land was not acknowledged for the purposes of meeting that qualification, and the result was that all but the tiny minority of Maori who had a Pakeha title to their land were effectively disenfranchised.
Out of land sales and disenfranchisement, Kingitanga or “the King Movement” was born. Foremost amongst its promoters were the strong and independently-minded rangitira of the Waikato region, and thus a meeting of the rangitira was held in that region in 1857. Although tribal support was not unanimous even amongst those iwi that were represented- the Arawa, for example, refused to be a part of the enterprise- the majority were in favour of the election of a King to preside over the Maori and look after their interests, just as the Pakeha had their Queen. At a second meeting the same year on an island in Lake Taupo, the King was selected- a venerable and famous Waikato war-leader named Potatau Te Wherewhero. Te Wherowhero, in his younger days during the pursuit after a battle in the Musket Wars, is said to have personally killed more than 150 enemy with his mere “Whakareka” before his arm became too tired to continue- but it was also said that many of the victims had begged to be killed by the great rangitira and not some lesser individual, as being slain by a man of such great mana would be in no way demeaning to the victim!
Te Wherowhero was formerly invested as King at Ngaruawahia in 1858. In 1860, the elderly King died and his son of approximately 35 years of age, Matutaera, took his place, with the support of the powerful Ngati Haua rangitira, Wiremu Tamihana, who was known as “The Kingmaker”. Not surprisingly, neither monarch was recognised by the Pakeha- instead Kingitanga was interpreted as a rebellion against the Queen. At first, however, the colonial government had no intention to take military action against the King. As Governor Grey would declare at a meeting in Waikato in 1861, the government would fight against the Maori kingdom with the sword, but “dig around it” until it fell.
The Taranaki War
Racial tensions over land sales came to a head in 1860 at Waitara in North Taranaki, when local settlers purported to purchase a large block of prime farming land without the consent of the rangitira with authority over that land, Wiremu Kingi of the Te Atiawa iwi. The sale process was particularly irksome to Kingi as he not only had chiefly authority over the block, but actually lived on part of it- the Pakeha had only dealt with one group of Maori in physical occupation of the land and decided to ignore the interests of the others. Despite the obvious problems with the purchase even by unexacting Pakeha standards, the colonial government decided to back the settlers against Kingi’s protests. Kingi responded by building a small L-shaped pa in a single night in the middle of the Waitara Block to defend the land against all comers.
Stung by the challenge to governmental authority, the troops garrisoning New Plymouth to evict Kingi by force. On 17 March 1860, 500 soldiers supported by 2 howitzers fired into the “L-pa” for most of a day from as close as 50 yards, but all of Kingi’s small garrison of 80 warriors survived in their bunkers and covered trenches and successfully evacuated the pa after night fell. Although the British troops could now occupy the Waitara block, Kingi and his force were intact and were soon receiving widespread local support. Not only did many Te Atiawa join his force, bringing numbers up to 200 or 300 warriors (some of the Te Atiawa remained pro-British and so did not assist Kingi), but the Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui iwi also mobilised some 400 – 500 men and commenced raiding outlying settlements south of New Plymouth.
It was soon realised by both sides that there was a prospect of intervention by the King Movement in the conflict, and there was a virtual suspension in hostilities during April and May as emissaries from government lobbied the King to stay neutral whilst the Taranaki tribes swore their allegiance to the King and sought reinforcements. The result was that no decision was made for Kingitanga as a whole to intervene, but a small contingent of Ngati Maniapoto went to join Kingi- either on their own initiative or to “test the waters”.
This contingent was present when a Kingi advanced onto the Waitara Block in early June with about 200 men and built a pa at Puketakauere, only a mile from the British camp. The British responded slowly, but before the end of the month the British despatched a force of 350 mostly elite troops from the flank companies and the Naval Brigade, along with the 2 howitzers, to attack the pa. After the howitzers had breached the Maori palisades, troops to the front of the pa assaulted the breach, whilst another party of troops attacked from the rear, the aim being to trap the Maori defenders so none could escape. Unfortunately for the attackers, the palisading was largely a ruse, and the main Maori line of defence was a line of concealed rifle pits to the front of the palisades. The fire from these pits repulsed two British attacks on the front of the position, and then when the frontal attacks ceased the defenders were shifted to launch a counter-attack against the British troops attacking to the rear who had not yet succeeded in breaking into the Maori position. This force of British attackers was shattered in turn, routed, and badly cut up by a Maori pursuit. The British lost 30 dead, 34 wounded, and some ammunition wagons abandoned in the retreat, compared to a mere 5 Maori killed.
No doubt encouraged by this victory, King Matutaera now sent substantial reinforcements to aid Kingi- the number fluctuated between 500 and 800 present at any given time. The Maoris then went on the offensive by raiding right up to the outskirts of New Plymouth and building strong pa within 2 miles of the town and even closer to some of the outlying British stockades vainly trying to protect settlers’ property and guarding the Waitara Block. Despite the fact that the British had 2,000 effectives and still outnumbered the Maori, they withdrew most of the civilians of Taranaki into the centre of New Plymouth, which was fortified and heavily garrisoned. The Maoris then proceeded to loot freely that part of the town outside the fortified perimeter, and set fire to some buildings. In August the pressure on New Plymouth was somewhat diminished as many warriors returned home to plant their crops, but the British were unable to push back the pa cordon around the town as whenever a major expedition was mounted against a particular pa, if weak it would be abandoned by the Maori until a threat to New Plymouth from another direction (or to one of the other stockades) forced the expeditionary force to be withdrawn for use elsewhere. If strong it would be defended and the British could not attack without risking another costly defeat.
After British reinforcements arrived to boost the troops in Taranaki to 3,500 men, a new policy was implemented from December 1860. The British decided to put continual pressure on the Maori by a systematic campaign of sieges against a succession of pa along the Waitara river. These sieges would be conducted by the time-honoured system of sapping- and approach trench would be slowly dug forward under the covering fire of artillery and small arms, and protected by gabions, sap-rollers and the like, until the Maori pa became untenable and could be captured. The British would then consolidate their gain by building a line of redoubts which would be garrisoned and used to guard the supply line for the siege against the next pa.
The sapping method proved slow but produced at least limited results. By the end of 1860 the first pa, Matarikoriko, had fallen, although with 23 British casualties lost in skirmishes to only 6 Maori and with the pa having no inherent value the victory was a dubious one. In January 1861, operations against the second pa, Huirangi, commenced. This time the Maori made a dawn counterattack against one of the British redoubts (No. 3), but unbeknownst to the Maori the garrison had been recently reinforced to 400 men and so the 140 attackers were repulsed with heavy loss. Huirangi was then abandoned, and the British moved to Te Arei in February. Maori resistance here was strong- sniping from concealed pits and launching a successful trench-raid, and so a month later the sap head was still 90 yards from the pa.
On 12 March 1861, a truce was declared. Wiremu Tamihana had arrived from Waikato and persuaded the warring Taranaki tribes to make peace on the basis of the present status quo whilst the Waitara purchase was formally investigated. The colonial government, worn out by the war and with success nowhere in sight, agreed to these terms. The fighting thus stopped with Waitara in Pakeha hands, but the Southern Taranaki tribes had captured the Tataraimaka Block south of New Plymouth and this was left in their control as a result of the truce. As the Tataraimaka Block was more than 6 times the size of the Waitara Block, it was the British that were the net losers in the year-long war.
The Road to the Waikato War
George Grey arrived in New Zealand in September 1861 to assume the governorship (for a second time). He attempted to reconcile with the Maori by offering to renounce the purchase of the Waitara block and to spend money extending administrative services such as magistrates’ courts into Maori areas, in return for an abandonment of Kingitanga. Thus the Maoris’ two main grievances, land sales and failure of the government to provide for Maori and Pakeha alike, would both be at least partly addressed.
These proposals might have proved attractive to many Maori if it were not for the distrust generated by the Governor’s policy of preparing for war even as he attempted to make peace. New troops were shipped into New Zealand (in response to false reports by Grey that Auckland and other places were in danger from large-scale Maori attack), and work commenced on building a major road from Auckland to the Queen’s Redoubt, which stood on the “border” between the Pakeha-controlled Auckland district and the Kingite-controlled Waikato and thus represented the likely starting point for an invasion. Even the new courthouses seemed to be specially designed with defence in mind so they could be garrisoned like castles in Maori-dominated regions. Thus a peaceful settlement was not reached.
In March 1863, Governor Grey went to Taranaki to supervise the reoccupation of Tataraimaka. This was initially done without Maori resistance, but there were subsequently a Maori ambush sprung, followed by a British punitive raid killing 24 Maori. There was no general resumption of fighting in Taranaki, however, as the Waitara purchase was officially renounced on 11 May. This meant that the land situation was now restored to the position of 1859, and thus the issue over which the Taranaki War had been fought was essentially resolved. In consequence, Grey felt safe in transferring the bulk of the troops remaining in Taranaki to Auckland, ready to participate in a major invasion of Waikato, which now seemed the only way to suppress the King Movement.
Personalities of the Waikato War
British Player Characters
Governor Sir George Grey
Governor Sir George Grey
Bio: Governor of New Zealand from the end of 1861. This was Grey’s second term as governor (his first term was from November 1845 to 1853), and his extensive experience in New Zealand gave him a better understanding of local conditions than most Pakeha in positions of authority. He had genuine sympathy for the Maori, but saw his principal constituency was the Pakeha settlers and thus took up their cause. Although supposedly under the control of the Colonial Office in London, Grey was able to use his virtual monopoly on reports sent to the Colonial Office to paint a false picture of Maori aggression in order the secure the troops he needed to suppress Kingitanga. He also fancied himself as a military commander, and was willing to take control of military operations if there was no general nearby.
Role: Governor Grey is the British Commander-in-Chief. He is responsible for all civilian matters and diplomacy with the Maori (both hostile and neutral), and may also take command of any theatre of war or operation not directly under the control of another British player character. He is also responsible for any raising of troops or other military resources from the North Island Pakeha population, or from the Queenite tribes.
Starting Forces: Governor Grey starts with all British (and colonial) land forces listed, other than those starting in Auckland Province.
Lieutenant-General Sir Duncan Cameron
General Cameron
Bio: In overall command of the British (and colonial) land forces in New Zealand and intending to personally lead the main military effort. Cameron was an able commander and administrator, and had extensive battle experience in the Crimean War. Although initially unfamiliar with New Zealand and the Maori, he quickly learned on the job, and soon developed a good understanding of Maori military methods. He also developed respect for the Maori as a people, to the extent that in operations after the Waikato War he became reluctant to use his troops to support what he perceived as land-grabbing exercises by the settlers.
Role:
General Cameron’s responsibility is to lead the British land forces in the most important
theatre- which is likely to be Waikato for at least the majority of the war.
Cameron should try to confine himself as much as possible to the business of
conducting offensive land operations in the principal theatre, leaving his
colleagues to take care of all other matters.
Starting Forces: General Cameron starts with all British (and colonial) land forces listed as present in Auckland Province.
Commodore William Saltonstall Wiseman
The Armoured Gunboat “Pioneer”, Commodore
Wiseman’s Most Potent Weapon on the Waikato
Bio:
Appointed Commander of the Australasian Squadron in
April 1863, in place of the luckless
Role: Wiseman has three roles. The first is to support British land forces- especially those commanded by General Cameron in the principal theatre- through the use of naval assets, such as gunboats, river transport corps, and Naval Brigade. Setting up a riverine supply system is likely to be an important part of these duties. The second is to conduct independent naval operations. These may be combined operations using whatever troops can be spared by the other players or newly-raised forces. Such operations may result in a new theatre/s of war being created, of which Wiseman would then assume command. The third role is to procure, and ensure the safe and speedy passage to the North Island of, reinforcements and supplies from the South Island or abroad.
Starting Forces: Commodore Wiseman starts the game will all listed British (and colonial) naval forces.
Kingitanga Player Characters
King Tukaroto Matutaera Potatau Te Wherowhero (Tawhaio)
King Matutaera
Bio: Son of the first Maori king, Potatau Te Wherowhero, Tukaroto was so named after one of his father’s battles, and later received the additional, baptismal, name of Matutaera (“Methuselah”). He succeeded to the kingship on his father’s death in 1860, at which time he was probably in his early 30s. He is best known to history by the name Tawhiao, which he received on 29 August 1864 from the Pai Marire prophet Te Ua Haumene after the conclusion of the Waikato War, but to avoid anachronism he will in this game be referred to by the name Matutaera as this was his principal name at the start of the Waikato War.
Like his opposite number, Queen Victoria, Matutaera was both a figurehead for his people as well as having considerable influence on policy, but could not rule other than by the consent of his senior “ministers”, the main Maori chiefs. The King was generally disposed towards the more moderate policy of Tamihana, although like Tamihana he was quite prepared to fight the Pakeha rather than give in to unacceptable demands. Later in life, Matuera (then known as Tawhiao) became a prophet and a pacifist.
Role: The King is, not surprisingly, the Commander-in Chief of Kingitanga. As well as looking after matters of economics, diplomacy, politics and other non-military affairs, the King is responsible for controlling any Kingite forces that are operating outside the regions commanded by the other 2 Maori players.
Starting
Forces:
Wiremu Tamihana Tarapipipi
Wiremu Tamihana Tarapipipi
Bio: Rangitira of great mana of the Ngati Haua iwi. Known as “the Kingmaker”, Tamihana was instrumental in establishing Kingitanga, and was the most influential figure in the movement other than (perhaps) the King himself. In his 50s during the Waikato War, Tamihana had in his youth many years of military experience during the Musket Wars, but in later life focussed on the arts of peace. He was both eloquent and an excellent administrator, devising a code of laws and setting up roads, schools and a postal system for his tribe prior to the Waikato War, as well as improving agriculture. He was also a committed Christian, building churches, protecting missionaries, and being well conversant with argument from a scriptural basis.
Tamihana wished Maori to live in mutually-beneficial harmony with the Pakeha, rather than entertaining any thought of “driving them into the sea”, but wanted to preserve a zone of Maori autonomy within New Zealand’s interior to balance the Pakeha domination of the coastal areas. He was a peace-maker rather than a war-monger, but was prepared to fight for his vision.
Role: Tamihana bears prime responsibility for Maori forces in the Waikato reagion east and north of the Waikato river (including but not limited to the lands of the Ngati Haua iwi) and in the neighbouring lands controlled by the Ngai-te-rangi, Ngati Maru, and Ngati Paoa iwi.
Starting Forces: Tamihana starts with command of the main Maori “army” at Meremere, and the outlying forces at Koheroa, and Paparata.
Rewi Maniapoto:
Rewi Maniapoto
Bio: Rangitira of great mana of the Ngati Maniapoto iwi (indeed, a direct descendant of the iwi’s founder), and a founding Kingitanga chief- although, contrary to general Pakeha belief at the time, not the principal leader of the movement. Rewi was probably in his 50s during the Waikato War, and was a veteran of the Musket Wars- in fact, serving in one battle under Te Wherowhero himself. He is perhaps the most experienced and able war-leader in Kingitanga at the outset of the Waikato War.
Rewi was more generally more “hawkish” than the King or Tamihana, but was not the hot-headed extremist that many Pakeha believed him to be, and was also a good “team player” known to sacrifice his own views on occasion in order to accommodate his fellows (indeed his famous “last-stand” at Orakau that helped establish his “hardline” reputation took place against his own better judgement in order to satisfy the wishes of other chiefs who had brought contingents to support Kingitanga and were anxious to engage in a battle).
Role: Rewi bears prime responsibility for Maori forces in the Waikato region west and south of the Waikato River (including but not limited to the lands of the Ngati Maniapoto iwi), and in Taranaki.
Starting Forces: Rewi starts with command of the force at Pukekawa (which may raid across the Waikato if desired), as well as the forces at Okato and Waitara in Taranaki.
Other Persons of Note
Alfred Domett: Premier of New Zealand from 6 August 1862, and parliamentary representative for Nelson (in the South Island). Domett had a hard-line Maori policy, supporting punitive land confiscation rather than negotiation. A strong supporter of the Waitara purchase, he was damaged politically when the purchase was renounced in May 1863 at the Governor’s insistence. A memo revealing an over-enthusiastic land confiscation policy led to the loss of further support, and he resigned on 30 October 1863.
Te Ua Horopapera Haumene: Maori prophet who founded the Pai Marire religion (also known as “Hauhau”) in Taranaki in 1862-3. Pai Marire was a combination of Christianity, traditional Maori beliefs and elements novel to both, and is still practiced today in a slightly modified form. Te Ua was a man of peace, but many of his senior disciples had a more violent interpretation of their religion, urging followers of the faith to kill Pakeha and promising that they would be immune from bullets if they truly had faith. Although such an interpretation was contrary to Te Ua’s teachings, the Pakeha soon came to think of all “Hauhaus” as dangerous and bloodthirsty fanatics. Pai Marire influence was limited to Taranaki at the time of the Waikato War, although it was soon to spread throughout the North Island and was a major factor in subsequent Maori/Pakeha warfare which lasted until 1872.
Colonel H. J. Warre: Commander of forces in Taranaki. He had a pet theory that “foreign priests” (presumably French) were encouraging and fostering Maori rebellion.
The
Set Up
Unit sizes are expressed in increments of 50 men. For colour, these are referred to as “companies”, although a full-strength company of British regulars was historically larger than 50 men.
Each Pakeha unit is graded from A-D with respect to troop quality, with A being the best and D the worst. Maori units are not graded for quality, as their fighting ability often depended more on their degree of commitment to a cause or inspirational qualities of their leaders than being a fixed quantity. Maori warriors at their most inspired would be considered “A” grade troops, but vacillating Kupapa considered as third-rate troops by their Pakeha allies might fight as such and be considered “C” grade. Kingite Maori would generally be classed either as “A” or “B” depending on circumstances.
British regiments include the “flank companies” designated as “light infantry” and “grenadiers” which are deemed to consist of the unit’s elite and thus have a higher quality rating than the remainder of the unit. “Naval brigades” consisted of marines and sailors drawn from Royal Navy warships, tended to be used in New Zealand as assault troops, and enjoyed a good reputation- they are thus classified as “A” grade troops.
British
Land Forces
Auckland
Province
Queen’s Redoubt: 12th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys); 14th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys); 40th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys); Colonial Defence Force Cavalry (B, 3 coys)
Drury: 65th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys); Auckland Militia (D, 2 coys); Imperial Transport Service (part) (C, 10 coys)
Otahuhu: 70th Regiment (B, 12 coys; A, 3 coys); Auckland Cavalry Volunteers (C, 4 coys); Auckland Rifle Volunteers (C, 3 coys); Auckland Militia (D, 2 coys)
Fort Britomart, Auckland: Royal Engineers (B, 1 coy), Royal Artillery (B, 2 coys), with artillery as follows:
6 x 12 pounder
6 x 6 pounder
6 x 24 pounder howitzers;
6 x 24 pounder muzzle-loading fortress guns; and
6 x 32 pounder muzzle-loading fortress guns.
Albert Barracks, Auckland: Auckland Militia (D, 4 coys)
Driving Wagons between Drury and Queen’s Redoubt: Imperial Transport Service (part) (C, 5 coys)
Taranaki
Province
Tataraimaka: Part 57th Regiment (B, 5 coys)
New Plymouth: Part 57th Regiment (A, 3 coys; B, 2 coys); Taranaki Rifle Volunteers (C, 2 coys); Taranaki Cavalry Volunteers (C, 1 coy); Taranaki Militia (D, 2 coys);
Bell Block: Part 57th Regiment (B, 5 coys)
Wellington
Province
Wellington: Colonial Defence Force Cavalry (B, 2 coys)
Wanganui: Colonial Defence Force Cavalry (B, 1 coy)
Hawke’s
Bay Province
Napier: Colonial Defence Force Cavalry (B, 1 coy)
Available
from Sydney, Australia
1 x 110 pounder
2 x 40 pounder
2 x 46 pounder mortars; and
6 Coehorn Mortars.
Naval Forces
Only the River Flotilla is capable of true riverine operations, although all vessels may enter Waikato Heads to disembark or transfer their cargo in the shelter of the river mouth.